IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

Stephen Del Sesto, as Receiver and Administrator of the Joseph Health Service Rhode Island Retireme Plan,	St. : s of :
Plaintiffs,	United States Courthouse Providence, Rhode Island
VS.	
Prospect CharterCARE, LLC, et al., Defendants.	Tuesday, July 20, 2021
BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SMITH UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
	A P P E A R A N C E S:
For the Plaintiffs:	MAX WISTOW, ESQ. STEPHEN P. SHEEHAN, ESQ. BENJAMIN G. LEDSHAM, ESQ. Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley, PC 61 Weybosset Street Providence, RI 02903
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For the Receiver:	STEPHEN DEL SESTO, ESQ. Pierce Atwood, LLP One Financial Plaza, 26th Floor Providence, RI 02903

(VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE)

20 JULY 2021

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THE COURT: We're here in the matter of Stephen Del Sesto, Receiver, of the St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island Retirement Plan vs. Prospect CharterCARE, LLC, et al. And we're here for the final fairness hearing on the class settlement.

8 So let's have all counsel who are going to speak 9 on anything -- I think we should probably have all of 10 you just identify yourselves for the record so that the 11 record is clear as to who is here for this hearing. So 12 why don't we start with plaintiffs, and then we'll move 13 over to the defendant side.

MR. SHEEHAN: Your Honor, it's Stephen P.
Sheehan appearing for the plaintiff, along with Max
Wistow.

MR. WISTOW: And Benjamin Ledsham is here also
sharing my screen. In case I do something stupid, he
can fix it. So Benjamin Ledsham also for plaintiffs.

20 MR. DEL SESTO: Your Honor, although I'm not an 21 attorney in this matter, I'm one of the litigants, 22 Stephen Del Sesto, the Receiver in state court.

23 THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead on defendants24 side.

MR. HALPERIN: I'll start. This is Preston

Halperin -- good afternoon, your Honor -- on behalf of 1 2 Prospect Medical Holdings, Prospect East. 3 MR. RUSSO: Mark Russo, your Honor, on behalf of 4 the remaining Prospect entities. 5 MR. GODOFSKY: David Godofsky, your Honor, on 6 behalf of Angell Pension Group. And Steve Boyajian is 7 here with me virtually. MR. MERTEN: Your Honor, Howard Merten and Gene 8 9 Bernardo is also on for the Diocesan defendants. 10 MR. HEMMENDINGER: And your Honor, Thomas 11 Hemmendinger, the Liquidating Receiver for CharterCARE 12 Community Board, St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island and Rogers Williams Hospital. Those entities 13 14 are also defendants in this case still. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think that 16 covers it. Oh, sorry. You were on mute there, Chris. 17 MR. FRAGOMENI: Good afternoon, your Honor. 18 Chris Fragomeni also on behalf of Prospect Medical and 19 Prospect East. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? I see some 21 activity going on here. 22 MR. CALLACI: Your Honor, Chris Callaci on 23 behalf of the United Nurses and Allied Professionals. 24 THE COURT: Got it. All right. I think that 25 covers it. Anybody else who wants to enter an

appearance?

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2 All right. So I'll hear from the plaintiffs. Ι 3 take it you have a bit of a presentation to make here. MR. SHEEHAN: Yes, your Honor, we do. There are 4 5 two motions before the Court: the motion for a final settlement approval and also the motion for attorneys' 6 7 And I'm going to address the motion for fees. 8 preliminary settlement approval, and Mr. Wistow is 9 going to address the motion for attorneys' fees. 10 Your Honor, with respect to final approval, the issues have been fully briefed. The standard on a 11 12 preliminary settlement approval is the probability that 13 the settlement will reach final approval and addressed 14 all of the issues that are involved upon which a 15 finding of final approval should be based. Also a 16 detailed notice was sent to all the Plan participants. 17 The briefs obviously were filed on all parties, and there were no objections. Consequently, your Honor, 18 19 I'm not going to address all of the issues. For the 20 most part, we're going to rely on the briefs and the 21 fact that there have been no objections.

I would, however, like to briefly address three issues. And the first issue, your Honor, is to briefly describe the settlement and answer any questions the Court may have with respect to the settlement. The

second issue is to briefly outline the procedural developments since the Court previously approved settlements in this case. And finally, your Honor, I'd like to just briefly discuss the form of any order to be entered granting settlement approval.

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If that pleases the Court, I'd like to start 6 7 first with the observation that the two settlements 8 that were previously approved were agreed to back in 9 the fall of 2018. The approval took one year. It was 10 very complex, your Honor. We had to obtain state court 11 approval in connection with the receivership from Judge 12 We had to obtain this Court's approval with Stern. 13 respect to Settlement B. We had to go back to state 14 court for a cy-près order allowing the settlement funds 15 to be disbursed from the defendant, which was a 16 charitable foundation. The Court allowed limited 17 discovery in connection with Settlement A. Depositions 18 were taken, et cetera.

While that was going on, your Honor, the federal court suit against Prospect, Angell and the Diocesan defendants was continuing and has continued since then. There were extensive motions to dismiss which reached finally hearing, and at the hearing it was decided that they would be dismissed -- denied, rather -- without prejudice in favor of cross-motions for summary judgment on the limited issue of whether the Plan was covered by ERISA. That briefing for the motion for summary judgment involved thousands of pages, your Honor. I'd like to say, first of all, that that briefing was complete at the point in time that the settlement was entered into indicating, which I think all parties will agree, the posture of the case at that point contributed to settlement; the fact that we had gotten to that stage in the summary judgment proceedings.

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11 The other -- there are two or three other lines 12 of development that were going forward in connection 13 with the issues in this case but not before this Court. 14 And one was superior court litigation and a case that 15 had been brought by CharterCARE Community Board when 16 Mr. Land was still involved with that entity and then 17 was taken over by Mr. Hemmendinger as Liquidating Receiver versus Prospect based upon CharterCARE 18 19 Community Board's initial 15 percent interest in the 20 two hospitals, Fatima Hospital and Roger Williams 21 Hospital through the corporations that own them.

The asset purchase agreement had obligated Prospect CharterCARE to contribute \$50 million in capital to those hospitals and had also, we contend, had obligated Prospect to cooperate with CharterCARE

Community Board in providing CharterCARE Community Board with the information that was needed to determine whether or not to exercise a put option, a right to sell the interest back to Prospect CharterCARE. Those issues were raised as breaches by Prospect in that case of CCCB v. Prospect.

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7 And that case is also a factor in the settlement, your Honor, in that the settlement provides 8 9 that -- covers what's going to happen in CharterCARE 10 Community Board's interests in these underlying 11 hospitals. It's going to be transferred to Prospect in 12 return for a stipulated value for the shareholding 13 interest of \$4 million and \$1 million value applied to 14 CharterCARE's causes of action against Prospect apart 15 from the value of its shares.

16 Since then, your Honor, there's also been 17 initiation of the liquidating receivership brought by 18 Mr. Hemmendinger on behalf of the three entities, 19 Rogers Williams Hospital, St. Joseph and CharterCARE 20 Community Board. And that was a condition of the 21 settlement approved by your Honor, Settlement A. The 22 Plan Receiver, through counsel, has also been involved 23 as a creditor in those proceedings. That liquidating receivership is also a factor in this settlement in 24 25 that the -- in connection with the settlement, Prospect is releasing all claims it might have in that liquidating receivership as well any claims it might have as creditor.

Since the prior settlements were approved by your Honor, a lawsuit was commenced by Prospect in Delaware that involved Prospect's claims that CharterCARE Community Board was in breach of its obligation and obligated to indemnify Prospect for many millions of dollars and ultimately any liability that Prospect might have to plaintiffs in this case. That lawsuit, if successful, would have eliminated the value of CharterCARE Community Board's interest in the hospitals. It is being dealt with in connection with the settlement. It's going to be dismissed.

There were also, your Honor, administrative
proceedings. Prospect filed applications for approval
from the appropriate regulatory agencies for a buyout
of --

19 THE COURT: We're getting some bad feedback from20 someplace. Off the record for a second.

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(Off-the-record discussion)

22 MR. SHEEHAN: I was starting to address, your 23 Honor, the administrative proceedings where Prospect 24 wanted to buy out its majority interest, Leonard Green. 25 Those who were before the Rhode Island Attorney General and the Department of Health, CharterCARE Community Board, through the Liquidating Receiver, was holding CCCB's interest in trust for the Plan Receiver and therefore was acting pursuant to the consultation and direction of Plan Receiver's counsel, Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley, objected to those applications for administrative approval and asserted that the payments were, indeed, fraudulent transfers that would have the effect of denuding Prospect Medical of assets that would be needed ultimately to meet Prospect Medical's liability in this case.

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12 Those administrative proceedings are also a 13 factor in the settlement, your Honor, as shown by the 14 fact that one of the elements of the settlement was the 15 requirement that plaintiffs withdraw those objections 16 and CCCB withdraw those objections. So there have been 17 a number of proceedings and they all, your Honor, 18 ultimately, we contend, led to this settlement. 19 They're extensive and detailed, and I'd be happy to get 20 into them. They are addressed in the papers, however.

Next, your Honor, I'd like to just briefly
address the form and timing -- well, before I do that,
I had intended at the outset to state the obvious, your
Honor, which is that this is a settlement for \$30
million, 27.25 of which is going to come from Prospect

and 2.75 is going to come from Angell. The settlement is going to be paid through letters of credit which when will be payable upon the Court's entry of an order along the lines of the order of final approval set forth in the settlement agreement.

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And that requirement from the settlement agreement is that the order of final approval state that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, number one. And two, it is in good faith -- a good-faith settlement under Rhode Island General Laws 23-17.14-35. And of course finally, third, such other and further relief as the federal court may direct.

13 So we would request, your Honor, that the order 14 of final approval, which is obviously going to include 15 a number of elements, specifically include those 16 findings so that Mr. Del Sesto may properly draw on the 17 letters of credit and properly certify to the registry of court and to this Court that Angell's portion of the 18 19 settlement should also be paid to him. Also with 20 respect to the timing of the order of final approval, 21 obviously plaintiffs are desirous of settlement -- of 22 the approval as soon as possible since it is the 23 trigger for payment. And we understand that Prospect, 24 for business reasons, would also like to have the 25 approval entered as soon as possible. Mr. Halperin, to

the extent the Court wishes, will address why that is the case.

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Unless the Court has any questions or any questions about how the settlement works, I'm going to defer now to Mr. Wistow

No. Let me hear from Mr. Wistow. 6 THE COURT: 7 Thank you, your Honor. I was going MR. WISTOW: 8 to say on the issue of an order entering quickly, I think I speak for Mr. Halperin also, as Mr. Sheehan 9 10 indicated, he would like it. I believe your Honor might want to issue a written decision. Obviously 11 12 that's up to you. And it obviously is not unheard of 13 to have an order enter, decision to follow. If there's 14 going to be a decision, I imagine it would take quite a 15 while to write it. And all the parties here, all of 16 them, I believe, are anxious to at least have the 17 order.

18 THE COURT: Why do you think I need to write a19 written decision?

20 MR. WISTOW: I don't, I don't. I'm not 21 suggesting you do. I'm suggesting if you wish to. 22 Obviously that's your choice, not mine. But if you 23 wish to, I was going to suggest and am suggesting that 24 an order enter, decision to follow. That's something 25 that Judge Stern did in one of our more complex situations in this case where there was a time element, he entered the order and then wrote a decision later. I'm not asking your Honor to write a decision.

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THE COURT: My feeling about this is this is -- maybe it overstates it to say that it's unique, but it's pretty close to unique. It's so highly complicated and idiosyncratic I think, I'm not sure that there's anything that I could say in a decision that would be of any value to anyone else other than the parties here.

And all of you really care about is -- I mean, you did all the work. I don't need to explain anything. I couldn't explain it certainly any better. I would just repeat what is said. But what you're interested in, I think, is the findings and the order.

MR. WISTOW: No, your Honor is right. The
chance of this decision being precedential in some
future case is pretty remote. I don't expect anything
like this to happen in the next hundred years or so, if
there's going to be another hundred years, so I agree.

Let me address -- Mr. Sheehan addressed the settlement eloquently. Speaking on behalf of the Receiver and the Plan participants, I would like to speak on behalf of my office with regard to the fee. THE COURT: Before you get to the fee, Mr.

1 Wistow, I'm looking at the -- so I'm looking at 2 the -- I think this is the order that Mr. Sheehan 3 referred to, but I don't think this is a final order. 4 This is the order of preliminary approval. This is 5 Exhibit D I believe to the papers. 6 Have you prepared a final order of approval of 7 the settlement, a draft, a proposed order? 8 MR. WISTOW: No. We can do that today or as 9 late as tomorrow. We wanted to -- we felt it perhaps 10 premature to do it, but we can do it today. 11 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Good enough. 12 So go ahead and tell me about the fees. 13 MR. WISTOW: All right. Well, what I can tell 14 you is that in going over this matter, in preparing for 15 it, I was startled to be reminded about just how 16 complicated it had gotten. And there were many, many 17 areas that have just simply not been before your Honor. 18 They were alluded to generally by Mr. Sheehan, but we 19 were intimately involved in all of these matters which 20 I'll touch on briefly, all of which truly led, I think 21 incontrovertibly, to the settlement that's before you. 22 For example, there is a state court suit in 23 which the receiver and the liquidating receivers both 24 joined claiming fraudulent transfers not only against

the Prospect Medical Holdings companies and their

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affiliates, but also the two stockholders of Prospect 1 2 Medical individually. A gentleman named Lee and 3 Topper. And there was an enormous amount of activity 4 in that case, none of which appears in this court, but 5 was extensively litigated in front of Judge Stern. And we've also been working, along with Tom Hemmendinger, 6 7 the Liquidating Receiver, to try to bring to final 8 fruition some additional areas which we think would be 9 the source, and Mr. Hemmendinger agrees with us, would 10 be the source of perhaps millions of dollars more for 11 the Plan. We continue to work on those issues. Thev 12 involve the RI DEM, the Rhode Island department of 13 Environmental Management, the Department of Labor, 14 Beacon Insurance and, most importantly, a significant 15 number of trusts that are in favor of the old Heritage 16 Hospitals in which we believe that we can convert into 17 payments to the Liquidating Receiver which in turn will 18 go into the Plan.

19 And we've been actively working on that. That's 20 one of the complicating factors. Mr. Sheehan mentioned the suit in Delaware. That was totally unexpected as 21 22 was the prior when we first signed onto this. Let me explain a little bit about the administrative 23 24 proceedings and why I think they play such a big role 25 in this settlement.

1 In Rhode Island, there are two agencies that 2 deal with the kind of conversion that Prospect Medical 3 was trying to attempt, and those are the Department of Health and the Department of Attorney General. 4 And 5 they have two completely different proceedings. One is called the Hospital Conversion Act and one is called 6 7 the Change in Effective Control. And we came in as 8 soon as we found about it, and in order to protect our 9 15 percent ownership interest in this we filed, on 10 behalf of both the Liquidating Receiver and the Plan 11 Receiver, formal objections. We appeared and argued 12 why these were fraudulent, why they should not go 13 forward. As a result of our filing extensive papers, 14 including reports from financial experts that these 15 entities were quite on the brink of insolvency, that 16 these deals should not go through.

17 And the Attorney General's office came in after 18 this and said we are going to go slowly and delay this 19 and our objections were filed in the fall of 2019. And 20 we continued to argue and submit documents. And before 21 the settlement was consummated -- I shouldn't say 22 consummated -- the settlement before you was agreed 23 upon, one of the important conditions was that the 24 plaintiffs would agree to withdraw their objections 25 from the administrative proceedings and agree not to

participate further in the matters nor to make public statements in the media about what they had been up to.

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We did withdraw that, but what happened was in June, June of this year, the Attorney General came down and, we believe, at least partially as a result of what we had stirred up, insisted on ultimately an \$80 million escrow to be filed with the Attorney General to ensure that the local hospitals are able to go forward; in addition, because of the threat of insolvency that we had raised. By the way, if we may say so, our fear of insolvency was why we asked for letters of credit from JPMorgan. We were not prepared to accept the promise of the defendants to make a payment.

I don't include Angell in that. Angell has deposited its share into the registry of the superior court. But in both cases we're completely secured.

17 In any event, the Attorney General has required 18 as of June 1st, I believe, of this year, an \$80 million 19 escrow to help support the hospitals. And in addition, 20 has made the hospitals agree -- made Prospect Medical 21 agree -- to stop charging 3 percent of the annual 22 revenues of these two hospitals as management fees. 23 That represents a savings for the hospitals -- I'm not 24 suggesting, by the way, your Honor, that that money is 25 coming to the Plan Receiver, but it certainly is for

the benefit of the community. There's millions of dollars each year that are not going to be paid to Prospect Medical as a result, we believe, of the stir we caused in the administrative proceedings.

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I want to go on to say that other things that we never anticipated when we got into this case were the various motions to adjudge each other in contempt. This was a very heated, controversial and adversarial conversation, as you'll hear in a little bit. Now, it's not just us who are saying this is complicated. The Retired Chief Judge Frank Williams submitted an affidavit, a declaration in this case under oath, in which he indicated that he had been involved in thousands of cases over his career and insofar as a mediator, he recalled many hundreds of cases.

He's been practicing, as you'll see from his
affidavit, for 50 years in private practice and as a
superior court judge, as the chief of the supreme court
and now has been actively involved as a mediator. He
described this case as, quote, complex, novel and
involving unsettled questions of law.

And he goes and he recites the complications that Mr. Sheehan and I have alluded to that are involved in this case but not before this Court. He ends up saying -- and I'd like to quote him -- he says, I believe that this litigation is unique within the United States. Other, quote, church plan, unquote, cases typically involve one employer, perhaps a hospital, continuously operating an employee benefits plan. The instant litigation involves more than a dozen defendants, each of which plaintiffs contend has liability for the shortfall in the funding of the Plan. Defendants deny any responsibility whatsoever.

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9 Then he goes on to say, This is, to my 10 knowledge, the first, quote, church plan, unquote, case 11 to involve even one state court-appointed receiver, 12 Moreover, the Prospect defendants have much less two. 13 been steadfast in their denial of liability for the 14 shortfall in the funding of the Plan based on the fact 15 that their agreement to purchase the assets of the 16 failing hospitals in 2014 expressly excluded any 17 responsibility for the sellers pension plan.

18 Then he says -- I hope your Honor can agree with 19 this -- he says, This matter represents one of the most 20 complex, if not the most complex, matters in which I 21 have been involved in all my years as a lawyer, judge 22 or mediator. And then he goes on to discuss the fee. 23 And I hope your Honor considers this sort of an expert 24 opinion. He says in paragraph 13 he says, Based upon 25 my experience as a judge and as a mediator, it is my

opinion that a request by Wistow, Sheehan and Loveley for an attorneys' fee in the amount of 23 1/3 percent of the \$30 million settlement in accordance with their court-appointed fee agreement with the Plan Receiver is reasonable and appropriate given the complexity of this matter and the significant relief recovered by Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley.

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8 I'm going to talk about the contract that exists 9 between our office and the Plan Receiver in a moment, 10 but I will point out that in his affidavit he does a 11 computation of the percentage fee that we would 12 actually be getting based on the fact that we had given 13 up a portion of our fees before to expedite getting 14 some money into the Plan. And he makes a computation that we're actually, if your Honor grants the 23 1/3 15 16 percent in this case, overall our fees would be 22.15 17 percent, which is lower than what he describes in the 18 affidavit which we put in our brief about the benchmark 19 usually used in percentage of the fund cases.

20 So we're below the benchmark of 25 percent. 21 We're even below the contractual agreement we had. 22 We're closer to the 20 percent to what he quotes is the 23 circuit cases generally go between 20 and 30 percent 24 with the benchmark being around 25. So we're actually 25 closer to the 20 percent than we are even to the 25.

Now, I want to emphasize, if I may, the 1 2 significance, we think the overriding significance, of 3 the contract we entered with the Plan Receiver at the very beginning of our involvement back in August of 4 5 And I refer you specifically, your Honor, to the 2017. affidavit of Stephen Del Sesto, the Plan Receiver. 6 7 That's document 2076. And the first thing I want to 8 comment about his affidavit or declaration, I should 9 say, but again under oath, is he says, and I quote, I 10 have read the declaration of Frank J. Williams, CJ Retired, dated January 19, 2021, and I concur with 11 12 everything stated therein. I would add that as to the 13 litigation history of this case which began in the fall of 2017, almost precisely three years before the 14 15 mediation, he says in my more than two decades of 16 practice, I have not been involved in another matter so 17 fiercely litigated or negotiated. That's a euphemism, 18 I believe, for the rancor that was going on between 19 counsel.

And by the way, all I can say is everybody was acting zealously, and it was at times very, very difficult. As I said, there were motions for contempt on both sides and so forth.

He explained also in his affidavit how we negotiated the fee of 23 1/3 percent. And he explains

how he did that as an officer of the court and as an 1 2 agent of the court as Receiver. And he indicates that 3 we actually -- shame on us -- asked for more and he negotiated us down to the 23 1/3 which we agreed to. 4 5 He then went and got the okay from Judge Stern, the 6 superior court judge in charge of the Plan 7 receivership, and he says -- and I ask your Honor 8 please to take this into consideration -- Mr. Del Sesto 9 says, It is important that plaintiffs' counsel have a 10 strong financial incentive to pursue the claims in this 11 litigation which are legally and factually complex and 12 extremely document intensive and span many decades of 13 Plan administration. I believe the existing fee 14 structure gave them that incentive and their zealous 15 prosecution of plaintiff' claims to date indicates that 16 belief -- excuse me, vindicates that belief. It would 17 be detrimental to the plan receivership estate for that 18 financial incentive be lessened and for Wistow, Sheehan 19 & Loveley be awarded fees that are less than the fees 20 to which they would be entitled under the retainer 21 agreement. Again, the agreement approved by Judge 22 Stern. Not to suggest for a moment that your Honor is 23 necessarily bound by that.

Now, let me suggest so far the benefit to the
Plan. The total gross payments so far, if your Honor

approves this settlement, will be over 41 -- bear with me just a moment. The settlements to date would be over \$47 million in gross. That's to be compared, your Honor, to get a sense of how meaningful that is, when the original acquisition took place by Prospect Medical Holdings of the Heritage Hospitals back in 2014, the total amount allocated out of the purchase price to go into the pension plan at that time was only \$14 million. And that's one of the protests -- one of the claims we made that they pulled the wool over the Attorney General's Office eyes at that time and that that 14 million was relatively meaningless.

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13 Even now with gross payments of three-and-a-half 14 times what was paid in 2014, we still have significant 15 We're hoping, and I say this in looking at shortfalls. 16 Mr. Reardon, we hope that we get the rest of it in 17 combination through the Liquidating Receiver and 18 through our remaining claims against the Diocese and 19 the Bishop. And we hope to be back at some point in 20 the future asking for 23 1/3 of the fees attributable 21 to any result we get with the Bishop.

Now, I want to tell you specifically what Judge Stern said about this particular settlement. And this is document 206 before your Honor. And this is a transcript of the hearing where he approved this particular settlement. And of course it was necessary he do that because one of the settling parties is his receiver. So the Receiver asked for instructions and of course, you know, recommended the settlement.

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But anyway, Judge Stern said when he approved this, in the transcript he said, I would concur with what was said. This very much is one of the most, if 8 not the most, complicated issue in litigation the Court has before it. The only one that I can think of that 9 10 may have been more complex was the case before my predecessor Justice Silverstein in another very large 12 case involving Mr. Wistow. So I'm flattered and 13 pleased about that comment. He was referring I believe 14 to the 38 Studios case.

15 Now, when ruling from the bench on the approval, 16 he said as follows, That contingency fee which was 17 negotiated between the Plan Receiver and Special 18 Counsel was previously approved by this Court and was 19 approved by this Court in the prior settlements as 20 With respect to the case presently before the well. 21 Court in the petition, the Court finds that the 22 contingency fees and costs are fair, reasonable and 23 certainly for the benefit of the plan receivership of 24 state and that contingency fee as well as reasonable 25 costs are approved. He goes on to say recognizing your

Honor's role in this he says, I certainly understand that Judge Smith is going to need to consider these fees with respect to the class action. And that is one of the main reasons, as I mentioned before, that while the Court is giving a decision from the bench at this point so we can proceed forward, I will issue a set of findings as well to supplement the decision, in other words, to aid your Honor in coming to an appropriate decision.

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10 Now, what's very, very, very unusual about this case as a quote, class action, is that FRCP 23(c)11 12 specifically says, and I quote, In a certified class 13 action, the Court may award reasonable attorneys' fees 14 and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by 15 the parties' agreement. Emphasis -- I'm sorry, I'm 16 reading from my own notes. So it is possible to have 17 an agreement as to attorneys' fees in a class action. 18 It would be very unusual obviously, because we would 19 need, the cases show, a very sophisticated party who is 20 one of the members of the purported lead plaintiffs; 21 one of the examples would be a situation where a 22 stockbroker feels that -- a group of stockbrokers have 23 been cheated in some fashion, wants to bring a class 24 action, is obviously much more sophisticated obviously 25 than the people who are the plaintiffs in this case.

Before I get into the relationship with the 1 2 individual plaintiffs and what they're getting out of 3 this, I would like to talk to your Honor about the percentage-of-fund method which is what we're talking 4 5 We're talking about a percentage of the \$30 about. 6 million. And the decisions in this circuit say that 7 the percentage-of-fund method is preferred in common 8 fund cases. And I quote from a decision from the 9 District of New Hampshire, it's in our memo, In re 10 Cabletron Systems. And they quote from the Third 11 Circuit case. They say, The percentage-of-fund method 12 is preferred in common fund cases because it allows 13 courts to award fees from the fund in a manner that 14 rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure. And it goes on to say this is something the 15 16 lodestar method cannot do.

17 Interestingly enough, there's a First Circuit 18 case -- there's 13 appeals involving the fires at the 19 -- I believe it's the *Metro Goldwyn Mayer* hotel 20 complex. And I quote from that case. It says, In 21 complex litigation in common fund cases, by and large 22 tend to be complex. The percentage-of-fund approach is 23 often less burdensome to administer than the lodestar 24 And they go on to say, Using the method. 25 percentage-of-fund method in a common fund case

enhances efficiency or, put into reverse, using the lodestar method in such a case encourages inefficiency. Under the latter approach, attorneys not only have a monetary incentive to spend as many hours as possible, but also faces strong disincentive to early settlement. If the plaintiff percent-of-fund method is utilized, the lawyer is still free to be inefficient or to drag her feet in pursuing settlement options, but rather than being rewarded for this unproductive behavior, she will likely reduce her own return and hours expended.

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Finally, one other quote from 13 appeals, the 11 12 First Circuit case. Another point is worth making --13 forgive me for reading all this material, your Honor, 14 but obviously this particular motion is a peculiar 15 importance to my firm. Another point is worth making, 16 because the percent-of-fund technique is 17 result-oriented rather than process-oriented, it better 18 approximates the workings of the marketplace. We think 19 that Judge Posner captured the essence of this point 20 when he wrote that, quote, The market in fact pays not 21 for the individual hours but for the ensemble of 22 services rendered in a case of this character, unquote. 23 And then the First Circuit goes on, The marketplace 24 pays for the results achieved. Then there's a -- I'd 25 like to quote from a district court case from

Massachusetts. And it says, quote, Within the First Circuit courts generally reward fees in the range of 20 to 30 percent with 25 percent as the benchmark."

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4 Now, your Honor, in this court in the past 12 5 months, this Court has awarded in two class actions 33 1/3 percent. And that's In re Loestrin and Kondash vs. 6 7 Citizens, which I submit -- and I don't mean to demean 8 the cases in any way -- were nowhere near as 9 complicated as what we've been through. And Magistrate 10 Judge Sullivan in the opinion adopted, but fully 11 adopted by your Honor, said -- I believe it's in the 12 Loestrin case -- and I quote her, Indeed, it is fair to 13 say that a, quote, Clear consensus among federal and 14 state courts, unquote, has emerged that the 15 percentage-of-fund approach is a more efficient, better 16 reason and effective method. Consistent with these 17 principles, the traditional one-third of the funds has been routinely approved as appropriate for TCPA 18 19 settlements in courts in other circuits.

Now, what I want to say is this is very much in our case because in a way it's not even a common fund case. Then let me explain what I mean by that. We have always regarded the principal plaintiff as the Plan Receiver. And the reason that we brought in seven putative class plaintiffs is actually set forth in the

retainer agreement that we have with those seven individual plaintiffs. And what that says -- and that also, your Honor, is part of the record in this case, the retainer agreement.

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5 It says, Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley believes that the Receiver has standing to bring all necessary claims 6 7 to protect participants and participants' beneficiaries. However, it is expected there may be 8 9 issues raised as to whether or not participants and 10 participants' beneficiaries have the standing as to 11 certain claims. To mitigate that potential issue, 12 Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley is proposing to join 13 class-action claims along with the claims of the 14 Receiver. You will be one of the several persons 15 represented by Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley named with 16 regard to the class-action claims.

17 And we disclosed to them at the time not only 18 our relationship with Mr. Del Sesto as Receiver but 19 attached a copy, with his permission, of the retainer 20 agreement that we had with him. Now, the reason we 21 added them was because the general rule is that a 22 trustee -- and we regarded Mr. Del Sesto to be a 23 trustee since he was operating the Plan -- the general 24 rule is you needn't join beneficiaries but there are 25 keen exceptions. We anticipated that we would get the most vigorous fights from the other side if we didn't add these people. I don't know what would have happened if we didn't, but that's what we anticipated, and we were very concerned because of the statute of limitations running out on some of the claims, for example, fraudulent transfers, we brought the suit just in time. And we didn't want to run across the risk that later on they could convince the Court that we should have brought in individual participants.

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10 Now, it's noteworthy, your Honor, that the only 11 benefits in any of these settlements so far, including 12 the proposal, are not going directly to any of these 13 Plan participants. This is not a common fund in the 14 sense that we collect \$40-odd million and then 15 individual plaintiffs put in their individual claims 16 and we disburse the money or some administrator 17 disburses the money to them depending on what their 18 individual claim is and whether or not they respond. 19 This is not that case.

This is a case where it's clear that every nickel of the settlement is going into the Plan receivership which, of course, has an enormous benefit to the Plan participants. It's just not the direct one and there is no common fund. Unless you want to call the Plan the common fund which in my belief, as class 1 actions go, it's different.

2 Now, in the document 207, Exhibit 13, which is 3 the fee agreement with the class-action 4 representatives, it expressly says that, quote, If a 5 monetary recovery is obtained for a plaintiff within the class, it goes on to explain that we go in and seek 6 7 fees for that. That didn't happen. There is no 8 monetary recovery whatever for any member of the class. 9 Again, not to say that they haven't benefited 10 enormously because of it. So in a sense we're really 11 not even seeking a fee from the class or a class fee. 12 It's really a ratification of the payment to Mr. Del 13 Sesto as receiver and a ratification of the contract we 14 entered into.

15 By the way, these seven represented plaintiffs 16 were referred to us by three lawyers. And I want to 17 explain that because at least one of them is here 18 today, and you have affidavits from all of them. We're 19 talking about Mr. Callaci, who has introduced himself, 20 representing the Union, Arlene Violet, who represents 21 something like 357 people, and Jeff Kasle who 22 represents 247. And let me explain what I mean by 23 "represents" and how involved this became.

When the petition was originally filed in
August 2017 by the Heritage Hospitals, that petition

was against the Plan itself. It was a petition to put the Plan into receivership. That was the receivership that ultimately resulted in the appointment of Mr. Del Sesto. But concomitant with that request to put that plan into receivership was a request to immediately reduce the benefits to all of the claimants. By "claimants," I mean the beneficiaries of the Plan. To automatically reduce everybody's payment by 40 percent immediately.

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10 There was controversy between the participants 11 as to who, if anybody, should bear that reduction. The 12 younger people felt, for example, that the older people 13 had been receiving payments for many years. They had 14 just begun or hadn't even begun; they shouldn't get a 15 reduction. The older people felt the younger people 16 could perhaps get a job somewhere else. They were 17 totally dependent. There was a third group I won't get 18 into.

I, of course, could not possibly get involved in that issue. In our fee agreement, it says we're not going to. Each of these people who is concerned about this ended up in groups that were represented pro bono by Mr. Kasle and Mr. Callaci and by Ms. Violet. Their function was to negotiate as best they could to try to figure out what to do, who would bear the 40 percent

reduction, if anybody.

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Those meetings took place with those three lawyers and Mr. Del Sesto as Receiver. Again, I stayed away from it completely. But when I became aware of who these people were and what they were doing, I asked them if they were interested in recommending representative plaintiffs to join in the case. And they did. And that's why I say referral by them.

9 And I want to emphasize that there's no referral 10 fee payment or anything like that. We would be 11 obliged, obviously, to disclose that to the Court if 12 there's any question of the fees that are being shared, 13 but there are not. So what we're saying here, your 14 Honor, is this in a sense is really not even a common 15 fund case, but if you consider it that, then most of 16 the cases say the percentage of the fund would be an 17 appropriate thing.

18 Your Honor, I'm not going to ask you for 19 sympathy or anything like that, but I wish to point out 20 that we are a small firm. Right now there is five of 21 us in the firm. There's a limit to how much we can do. 22 We've been consumed with this case. And we've had a 23 significant opportunity cost associated with 24 taking -- deferring action on some cases where it's 25 possible, turning away cases that came to us, and I

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think that has to be taken into consideration here.

We have filed declarations by Mr. Callaci, Ms. Violet and Mr. Kasle who not only ask the Court to approve the settlement itself, but affirmatively ask the Court to approve our fee of 23 1/3 percent. Those people represent -- those three individuals who I mentioned represent over a thousand of the Plan participants.

9 It should be noteworthy that not one single 10 participant that, as I understand it, has filed an objection to anything, indeed, nobody has filed an 11 12 objection to anything with the exception of Mr. Merten 13 who has the technical objection that he wants to 14 preserve the situation with the special statute that 15 was passed; he wants to continue to say it's 16 unconstitutional. And we've offered that originally, 17 and we have no problem with that. With that caveat 18 that he's preserved that, the only remaining defendants 19 in the case have no objection.

Incidentally, what's interesting, I might point out, is that on July 14th the Governor signed a statute, signed legislation, that should have been done years and years ago, doing away with these special statutes that have been passed. This is the fourth one I've been involved in. The *RISDIC* one, there was a special statute that recognized that the non-settling defendants would only get a pro tanto and not a pro rata benefit from it. Then that was followed by the *The Station* fire special legislation. Then followed by *38 Studios* and now here.

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Now, the legislature has -- this is just of general interest, I think partially as a result of the activity here in these kind of cases -- has changed the law in Rhode Island so now Rhode Island follows what's the majority statutory scheme which gives only pro tanto relief to the non-settling defendants rather than pro rata. Having said all of that, I'd ask your Honor to award us our fees.

14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Wistow.
15 All right. Any comments from defendant counsel?
16 MR. HALPERIN: Your Honor, Mr. Halperin. I do
17 have a couple of comments, if I may?

THE COURT: Let's start with Mr. Halperin, yes. MR. HALPERIN: Thank you.

Your Honor, on behalf of all of the Prospect entities, we obviously are here in support of the settlement that we've entered into and have nothing to say other than to ask the Court to approve it as quickly as is possible. And we certainly support the notion that an order consistent with what we need for the plaintiffs to be able to draw on the letter of credit is actually critical. There's very specific language in the letters of credit that must be compiled with. And it refers back to the settlement agreement as Mr. Sheehan indicated.

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It's no different than what your Honor already 6 7 approved back in September of 2019 with the earlier 8 settlement in which the Court made a finding that the settlement was entered into in good faith and 9 10 determined to be fair, adequate and reasonable. The 11 only slight difference is our language in our 12 settlement refers to good faith under the Rhode Island 13 statute. That was the only distinction. I'm not sure 14 whether that's a distinction with meaning, but if the 15 Court is inclined to reference that, that would be 16 helpful. And we too have no issue with the reservation 17 that the Court also included in the previous settlement 18 that the issue of whether the settlement statute is 19 preempted by ERISA or is unconstitutional are preserved 20 for the future on behalf of the other litigants. So 21 that would resolve the issues with respect to getting 22 the monies flowing if the Court could focus on that.

23 With respect to the overall case, I certainly 24 share the sentiment that Mr. Wistow indicated that 25 there were a lot of factors that led to this settlement. And it certainly was fiercely litigated, there's no question about that. I do want to state for the record that Mr. Wistow brought up the fact that the Attorney General in a regulatory proceeding that really has nothing directly to do with this case, ultimately did approve the effective change of control that Prospect was seeking with conditions, one of which is that certain letters of credit be posted.

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9 But what I would like to put on the record is 10 that in that same decision there was a finding that 11 Prospect had fully complied with the conditions that 12 were imposed back in 2014. And it were subsequent 13 events, transactions that Prospect entered into, that 14 led to the concern that there was a financial 15 instability and a need for these new conditions to 16 approve this new application. So I did not want that 17 to be unsaid.

Lastly, your Honor, I would like to publicly thank Retired Chief Judge Frank Williams. Without his efforts going between myself and Mr. Wistow and Mr. Sheehan, there's no likelihood that we would be here today. And I think he deserves a significant amount of credit. I'd just like that noted for the record. And with that, I thank the Court for the time.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Halperin.

1 MR. WISTOW: I was remiss in not thanking Judge 2 Williams also. I can tell you that he moves people. 3 He would call us up 2 o'clock in the morning and say, Mr. Wistow, what's your answer to Mr. Halperin's latest 4 5 proposal? He would call on the weekend. And there's no doubt that he played a vital role in the situation. 6 7 I'm sure he woke up Mr. Halperin from time to time. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you. I know he 9 did a great job and I've spoken to him about it, and I 10 got an email from him. I know he had hoped to attend 11 this hearing actually but was caught up in another 12 mediation so he said he was unable to attend but made 13 himself available if there were any questions. 14 But let me ask, I know Mr. Merten was about to 15 say something so let me ask him. 16 MR. MERTEN: Very quickly, your Honor. Despite 17 how complex everything was and how bitter everything 18 was fought leading up to this point, there seems to be 19 complete agreement as to the motions before the Court 20 and the inclusion of the provision that the Court put 21 in its March 26th, 2021, order with respect to the 22 constitutionality paragraph 22, which is the only issue 23 that the Diocesan defendants raised. So we think the 24 path forward is probably pretty clear with respect to the settlement and even the attorneys' fees. 25

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THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

Mr. Godofsky.

MR. GODOFSKY: Yes, your Honor. Thank you very much.

5 So I would like to just emphasize the point that Mr. Sheehan made about the complexity of this case and 6 7 the value of the settlement to the class. This case 8 was filed more than three years ago. We are still not 9 through the motion-to-dismiss phase. If it were not 10 for this settlement, we would face heated litigation 11 over novel issues involving pleading standards, 12 standing, class certification, fiduciary duty, 13 privilege, breach of duty, damages, church plan issues, 14 funding standards for church plans and successor 15 Many of these issues are issues of first liability. 16 impression or unsettled law or extremely unique factual 17 issues. If it were not for this settlement, plaintiff 18 class would be probably years away from getting any 19 money from any of the settling defendants, if any, and 20 if ever.

Given that, given the fact that this case has been truly fiercely litigated and that it would not be over were it not for the settlement, Angell's position is that this settlement is a good settlement, it's a fair settlement. And Angell would also like to request a quick ruling on the fairness of the settlement. We believe it's in everybody's interests for this to be resolved quickly.

Thank you very much, your Honor. If you have any questions for me, I'd be glad to answer them.

THE COURT: No, I don't have any specific questions.

All right. Any others?

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MR. CALLACI: Your Honor, may I be heard? THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Callaci.

11 MR. CALLACI: Your Honor, my name came up when 12 Mr. Wistow was making some comments; thankfully not in 13 the pejorative. He did make note of the fact that I 14 submitted a declaration in this case. And while it 15 does speak for itself, I do want to say that I come 16 before you today standing by what I said in that 17 affidavit; offering the Union's unequivocal support for 18 the terms of the settlement, for the legal fees under 19 the engagement and fee agreement that's been approved 20 by the Court a long time ago.

I have the good fortune of representing nearly 400 union members who are among the 2700 participants in this case. And they wanted me to go on the record today to also say that they are grateful that there have to date been no cuts to the benefit. They are

grateful for the brilliant work that has been done by 2 the Plan Receiver, Mr. Del Sesto, the Special Counsel, 3 Mr. Wistow, Mr. Sheehan, Mr. Ledsham. And they have all kept, at least the folks I represent, fully 4 5 informed over the course of this litigation, which is not an easy thing to do but it's a critical and 6 7 important thing to do because when you are worried 8 about your income security when you're on a fixed income, when you are retired, at the very least knowing 9 10 what's going on in the case and being fully informed; it lends some calm to an otherwise un-calm and 11 12 nerve-racking situation.

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13 And I wanted it to be clear that the folks I 14 represent are grateful for the work that has been done 15 so far and for the steady hand of the Court. Thank 16 you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.

Any other -- yes, Mr. Hemmendinger.

19 Sorry, your Honor. MR. HEMMENDINGER: I don't 20 have anything specific to add to what other counsel 21 have said on both sides in support of the settlement, 22 but I particularly agree with what Mr. Sheehan and Mr. 23 Wistow have said about the merits of the settlement, 24 the benefits of the settlement and the work that was 25 done to achieve it. Thank you.

THE COURT: 1 Thank you. MS. VIOLET: Your Honor, could I be heard? 2 3 THE COURT: Who is that? 4 MS. VIOLET: Arlene Violet, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Oh. sure. Your name wasn't on there, Ms. Violet. Go ahead. 6 7 MS. VIOLET: Your Honor, I just want to echo 8 Attorney Callaci's comments. My clients certainly support 100 percent this settlement. And I also want 9 to comment on the absolute brilliance of the Wistow 10 11 firm, textbook legal work that they did, and the total 12 support of the fees that they are requesting. Thank 13 you, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Anyone else? 15 Well, I thank you all for the Okav. 16 presentations and the comments. So I'm going to keep 17 my comments fairly brief on the record here. I would 18 like to have a written order prepared, but let me keep 19 it fairly simple. 20 I am going to approve -- grant final approval of 21 the settlement, certify the class, the class 22 representatives and counsel. And I'll also make the 23 finding requested with respect to good faith under 24 Rhode Island General Law Section 23-17.14 to 35. And

the order that will issue should note the reservation

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with respect to the Diocesan defendants with respect to their argument about the statute being preempted or unconstitutional. So I'm going to ask plaintiffs' counsel to prepare an order to that effect and also approving the attorneys' fees in the amount in the percentage requested.

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7 Just by way of sort of general comments with 8 respect to this approval, I don't believe it 9 would -- as I've indicated earlier, that it's either 10 necessary, nor would it be all that much help to anyone 11 for me to write an opinion in this case. One of the 12 reasons I feel that way is not just its uniqueness, but 13 I think this is about the most well-supported and 14 thoroughly vetted settlement and request for attorneys' fees that I've seen, and I've presided over a number of 15 16 class actions which have resulted in settlements. But 17 by the time it's gotten to me at this juncture, it has essentially been vetted and approved by Judge Stern, 18 19 with a very thorough and well-reasoned and compelling 20 written opinion which has been referenced here. The 21 affidavit of Retired Chief Justice Williams, which is 22 also comprehensive and thorough and places the case and 23 the settlement and the attorneys' fees award in 24 context. The fact that the fee award was negotiated by 25 a very sophisticated receiver, Mr. Del Sesto, who is as

experienced in these matters as anyone in the bar and who I think negotiated a very good fee arrangement and contract with the Special Counsel on behalf of the members -- on behalf of the receivership I should say. And it comes to me not only with all of that support but now, as we've just heard on the record, the support in the affidavits of Mr. Callaci and Ms. Violet and Mr. Kasle on behalf of the individual members of the Plan who are the ultimate beneficiaries of this settlement when the money is paid. And all of that in combination just overwhelmingly suggests to me that the settlement is fair and reasonable and for the benefit of all of these members.

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14 In addition to that, the percentage strikes me 15 as more than reasonable I think that in the 16 circuit -- the cases have been cited. I've commented 17 on this in prior decisions, but the percentage-of-fund 18 method has been adopted and approved by the First 19 Circuit and in the district courts. And I think the 20 actual percentage here, the 23 1/2, is well within the 21 usual percentages that are approved. It's been noted 22 that those are typically between 20 and 30 percent. In 23 my experience, they're sometimes over 30 percent. So I 24 think that 23 1/2 percent that was negotiated here is 25 more than reasonable.

And that's especially true in light of the complexity of what -- complexity of this case. It is among the certainly top three or four of most complex cases that I have been involved in, although my own -- I will say very thankfully that most of the complexity has been dealt with on your side of the screen and not on my side of the screen and maybe in Judge Stern's court. I think we have -- on this side we've skated a little bit free of the rancor and the -- maybe not all the rancor, but a lot of it and some of the complexity.

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12 I think Mr. Wistow mentioned the Loestrin case. 13 I don't see anybody on this screen who was involved in 14 that case, but don't underestimate the Loestrin case. 15 There were 25 testifying experts and 50 substantive 16 motions in limine and settled right after I impaneled 17 the jury and just before opening statements. And it 18 was, I think, a \$300 million settlement, if my 19 recollection serves me correctly, in an antitrust class 20 action, multidistrict litigation case. So I put this 21 maybe in that same league.

So when I look to the 23 1/3 percent, and just by my own experience comparing it to some other cases where certainly higher percentages have been approved for equal or lesser intensity of work, I will say that

I think that Mr. Wistow and Mr. Sheehan and their firm have -- did some really exceptional lawyering and very creative and very tenacious so I have no trouble approving that fee award.

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So I don't think it really is necessary for me to say too much more than that. I would just ask you to prepare a written order and circulate that order before submitting it to other counsel for any comment. And then once you submit it to me, I will review it and make any changes I think are necessary and I'll get that executed. And I think that will get you on your way to getting these funds distributed.

MR. WISTOW: Thank you, your Honor.

14 THE COURT: All right. So is there anything15 else before we sign off?

16 MR. WISTOW: I guess I have to give you some bad
17 news. We may be back in front of you with the
18 remaining defendants.

19 THE COURT: Yes. I figured that we would be 20 setting something up. Maybe we can go off the record 21 for just a moment before we adjourn just so that we 22 don't bother the court reporter with this, but what is 23 your plan in terms of the rest of the case?

(Off-the-record discussion)

(Time noted; 3:25 p.m.)

I, Lisa Schwam, CRR-RPR-RMR, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a correct transcript of a remote video conference prepared to the best of my skill, knowledge and ability of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /S/ Lisa Schwam Lisa Schwam, CRR-RPR-RMR Date: Federal Official Reporter August 3, 2021