STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT ST. JOSEPH'S HEALTH SERVICES OF) RHODE ISLAND) VS.) C.A. NO. PC-2017-3856) ST. JOSEPH'S HEALTH SERVICES OF) RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT PLAN)

HEARD BEFORE

THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BRIAN P. STERN ON SEPTEMBER 7, 2018

STEPHEN DEL SESTO, ESQUIRE. MAX WISTOW, ESQUIRE. STEPHEN SHEEHAN, ESQUIRE. SCOTT BIELECKI, ESQUIRE. ANDREW DENNINGTON, ESQUIRE. RUSSELL CONN, ESQUIRE. SEAN LYNESS, ESQUIRE. FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PRESTON HALPRIN, ESQUIRE. FOR PROSPECT CHARTERCARE JOSEPH CAVANAGH ESQUIRE. FOR PROSPECT CHARTERCARE

APPEARANCES:

GINA GIANFRANCESCO GOMES
COURT REPORTER

CERTIFICATION

I, Gina Gianfrancesco Gomes, hereby certify that the succeeding pages 1 through 36, inclusive, are a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes.

GINA GIANFRANCESCO GOMES
COURT REPORTER

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Madam clerk, if you 3 would please call the case. 4 THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor. PC-2017-3856, St. 5 Joseph's Health Services of Rhode Island vs. St. Joseph's 6 Health Services of Rhode Island as amended Bank of 7 America, Trustee. Counsel, please identify yourselves for the record. 9 MR. DEL SESTO: Good morning, your Honor. Good 1.0 afternoon, your Honor. Stephen Del Sesto, Court 11 12 Appointed Receiver. MR. WISTOW: Max Wistow, counsel for the Receiver. 13 MR. SHEEHAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Stephen 14 Sheehan, counsel for the Receiver. 15 MR. BIELECKI: Good afternoon, your Honor. Scott 16 Bielecki for CharterCARE Foundation. 17 MR. DENNINGTON: Andrew Dennington for CharterCARE 18 Foundation. 19 Good afternoon, your Honor. Russell Conn MR. CONN: 20 for CharterCARE Foundation. 2.1 Mr. LYNESS: Good afternoon, your Honor. 22 Lyness on behalf of the Department of Attorney General. 23 MR. HALPRIN: Preston Halprin for Prospect Medical 24 Holdings and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. 25

MR. CAVANAGH: Good afternoon, your Honor. Joseph Cavanagh for Prospect CharterCARE, LLC; Prospect CharterCARE SJHSRI LLC, Prospect CharterCARE RWMC, LLC.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. This emergency motion was filed and the Court took it up yesterday in a hearing on another matter by CharterCARE Foundation for the Receiver's petition for settlement instructions and an emergency motion postponing the September 13th hearing. The Court set this matter down for 3:00 p.m. today. The Court has received the Receiver's objection to the emergency motion.

In addition, and the last check was probably about ten minutes ago, the Court also received a motion from the Attorney General's Office joining in the emergency motion asking that the September 13th hearing be postponed. And also the Court did receive a motion from Prospect Medical Holdings, Prospect East, Prospect CharterCARE SJHS RI, and Prospect CharterCARE RWMC to also continue the hearing.

I understand that earlier today -- and the response that I received only dealt with the objections from CharterCARE. I'm going to start with if the CharterCARE Foundation would like to add anything to the papers.

MR. CONN: Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

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MR. CONN: And thank you for hearing us on short notice and making the Court available on a Friday afternoon at 3:00 to hear an emergency motion. That's not lost on me. As you know, I represent CharterCARE Foundation along with Mr. Dennington from my office and Mr. Bielecki, who is here as our local counsel. Mr. Donald McQueen is sitting in the back of the courtroom. He is the president of the CharterCARE Foundation and the president of the board.

So we got this Monday at 5:00, looked at it as best we could Monday night and Tuesday, and put together a fairly quick four-page emergency motion requesting more time. We requested a little more than three weeks to respond to this on the merits. The four-pager that we filed on Tuesday was by no means an exhaustive recitation of the issues we see with this petition. Make no doubt about it in the wherefore clause of the petition it does ask this Court to approve the settlement, and if the Court is going to approve the settlement, there is a lot at stake here. We start with the \$11 million but then there is the transfer of whatever interest CCCB has and We have the Prospect issue, which I'm sure their counsel can address.

We're just simply asking for more time. It's a very important motion. A lot is at stake for everybody. Mr.

Wistow filed this at 5:00. He gave us -- I mean if we count Monday, it's one day and we got that at the end of the day. It only gives us nine days, and it's just not enough to fully brief this.

I wasn't trying to put all of my arguments in a four pager, but I would add a couple of things to it since Mr. Wistow choose to write a very impressive and put together a 24-page brief overnight, not overnight, but filed it by 10:30 last night.

I want to address one thing that wasn't really in our four-pager and flushed out very well. We can address standing, we can address prematurity and all of that stuff in our briefing when we get to it, but the Attorney General actually made the point better than we did, frankly, in our papers and that is the Court should be --standing aside, the Court should not approve a settlement that contains an illegal term, and we feel that divesting the independent board of CharterCARE from the stewardship of these \$8 and a half million of charitable assets, something that was approved by the Attorney General, approved by this Court.

And I understand that this Court's order is under attack in a collateral proceeding. That's fine. We can deal with that in due course with due process and everything else. And Mr. Wistow will have a fair shot at

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arquing that he is entitled to that \$8 and a half million and this Court can decide or the federal court can decide it, the First Circuit, Rhode Island Supreme Court, somebody can decide in the end whether the pension fund is a creditor for these restricted assets and they should take them ahead of the interests of the donors of those restricted assets that resulted in those moneys being put in the foundation. That's the ultimate legal issue that has to be decided. What this settlement would do is do an end around all of that and put all of these funds in the hands of Mr. Del Sesto and his board which is largely receivership control, and there isn't any doubt that if you did that, we would go from having charitable funds administered by an independent charitable foundation to having charitable funds now being administered by a Receiver of a pension And we need some time to brief the legality or fund. illegality of that issue, number one.

Number two, however you look at it, that's an end around. This Court has already ruled on April, 2015, that those moneys should go to this foundation to be administered independently by the foundation for charitable purposes. In fact, for three years the charitable foundation had to report to the attorney general and make sure and satisfy the attorney general

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that they were operating independently and not under the control of the former hospital entities and they did that, I believe, to the attorney general's satisfaction. However you look at it, we also think this settlement agreement is tainted because it is an end around this Court's order. It just undoes by the fee item of the settlement agreement what the Court has already adjudicated.

So we think these are really important issues. know, we were able to negotiate. I had to agree to a stand still order to get it. We were able to negotiate a really fair, I thought, schedule to address the intervention thing that we're going to address next Thursday. And the Court got, I think as you indicated yesterday, some very thorough briefing. I think we are up over a hundred pages now. At least the Court can consider that and now decide that motion fully briefed on To try to ram this through on basically eight days notice and not give us a fair chance to bring to the Court's attention why we think this settlement agreement is tainted by illegality, we think it's not fair to us. It's not in the best interest of justice. And to do a three or four-week continuance as we did with the motion to intervene, respectfully I would suggest doesn't prejudice the pension fund that significantly.

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still have to go through federal court even if they make it through here. That's a long process. So their papers are always talking about doing justice and doing what's right. And doing justice and doing what's right we would submit is to give us sufficient time to fully brief this. I suggest we set up a briefing schedule and do this the right way. I'm not going to get into the abandonment.

THE COURT: I guess my question is in reading your papers is your issue that portion of the settlement that is going to be before the Court on the next week or another time dealing with the foundation?

MR. CONN: Correct. That is our part of the case and that's what we object to and that's where we think the illegality taints this settlement agreement. Again, I don't intend to go over the abandonment independence issues because we really need to develop the record for the Court on that. There is a lot more we have to present that you haven't seen. I will say that Mr. McQueen is here. If it ever comes to it that we have an evidentiary hearing, he will certainly raise his right hand and swear that they have been operating as an independent foundation for at least the last three or four years without oversight interference from CCCB, and, certainly, he will testify to numerous conversations with the people on the CCCB Heritage Hospital side that they

understood that they are going to be separate. They were even kicked out of their space.

THE COURT: I think you're right, counsel. It's not an issue for today. For good or bad, I spent three hours in another hearing specifically on waiver issues so that's fine.

MR. CONN: Okay. So we respectfully suggest this be put over at least until the week of October 8th. As I indicated in my papers, as I told Mr. Wistow, I hated to put it in there, but it is a reality. I am going out of the country from the 16th to the 30th. I can have people working on this while I'm gone but I would like to come back to this and have some time to look at it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Does the attorney general wish to be heard with respect to the joinder and the motion?

MR. LYNESS: Just briefly, your Honor, and thank you for the opportunity to speak. You mentioned earlier you received our papers and we appreciate the Court's willingness to do so even just a couple of hours before the hearing. I will be brief. I think the attorney general has a unique perspective on this in addition to what you just heard. Certainly, I'll start off by saying the attorney general is certainly sensitive to the need

to resolve this matter expeditiously. Certainly, we in no way wish to unduly burden the process or draw it out in any way, but not withstanding having received this proposed settlement just a short time ago, the attorney general, like the other parties, has not had a full and fair opportunity to make sure that the terms comply with the statutory obligations and responsibilities of our office. Specifically, that is the decision and conditions under the Hospital Conversion Act and the charitable trust rules that are entrusted to the attorney general to enforce.

I don't want to get into the specifics of those. We haven't had time to really delve into those, but certainly they raise concerns in our office and we would like some time to be able to ascertain whether or not our statutory obligations are going to be interfered with by this proposed settlement. We would join CharterCARE Foundation's motion to continue this out a couple of weeks to give us that time to fully examine the proposed settlement. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney Wistow, would you like to address all at once or do you want to just address CharterCARE?

MR. WISTOW: I think for the sake of good order, I would like to do CharterCARE at the moment.

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THE COURT: That's fine. You may proceed.

Thank you. With regard to the MR. WISTOW: submission by CharterCARE Foundation that your Honor has seen, I regard it as a fairly high hypocrisy. The reason I say that, your Honor, is within the submission to you, they expressly say that we seek to sacrifice CharterCARE Foundation and its charitable mission in the interest of pressing expediency for St. Joseph Hospital Society, Rhode Island, Roger William's Hospital, and CharterCARE Community Board. I want to say, your Honor, that the "charitable mission" is being carried out with money that should be in the hands of the participants of this plan. It's very easy to be charitable with other people's money, and that I believe is what is happening here. The settlement is not for the benefit of St. Joseph's Hospital, for Roger William's Hospital, for CharterCARE. It's for the benefit of the estate, which really as a practical matter, the only creditors with any substance at stake are the participants in that plan.

Now, I want to say, your Honor, that the participants in this plan have been under tremendous anxiety and pressure for more than a year now, from the filing of the petition to cut their pension benefits by 40 percent. Now that we have given them some indication of some hope of getting this resolved, we're going to put

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I want to say something about the charitable nature of the foundation, and I have submitted to your Honor their filing with the I.R.S. for the fiscal years 2015 and 2016. And the fact of the matter is that during that period of time -- and that's all that is available. That's the most recent filings. During that period of time they gave away to "charitable" purposes some \$210,000. For administration they used up \$254,000. The majority of that for the salary of the executive director, Paula Iacono, \$167,000 during that two years. And by the way, that's the same Paula Iacono who was present in the courtroom during the cy pres proceedings in 2015 and did not inform the Court, nobody informed the Court, that when there were questions about the donor's intent, she determined what the donor's intent was by communicating with "family members." That should have been told to the Court, so I'm not terribly impressed with the charitable standards of these philanthropists.

Now, on the merits of where we are today, our principle argument is that there is absolutely no standing whatever on the part of CharterCARE Foundation to involve itself in whether or not this settlement is beneficial to the estate, which is the ultimate question. On top of that, I think their submissions to the Court

about the present ownership interest is again misleading the Court. I'm not suggesting Mr. Conn did it on purpose, but it's not the factual representation of where CharterCARE Community Board stands, and I will get into it very, very briefly.

We have made full disclosure to the Court that the ownership interest that we are going to be getting if the settlement is approved, not only by your Honor but by the federal court, is disputed. We have said that flat out. We have given you exhibits. It's Exhibit 13 talks about the ownership of the CharterCARE Foundation and we said it flat out, potentially dispute paragraph 25 of the submission we gave your Honor. We said can we please settle this case.

I'll quote you what we said, "The proposed settlement gives the Receiver the beneficial interest in settling Defendant's CCCB's interest in CharterCARE Foundation. However, the nature and value of that interest is disputed. Accordingly, the settlement value of that interest cannot be estimated at this time. So what we bought is another lawsuit, which we're happy to pursue. Your Honor may decide on the motion to intervene that we have no standing to intervene or if you allow us to intervene, or the Court may say I'm not vacating my order and we'll be confronted with a res judicata,

collateral estoppel problems, and the like.

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So what is going to happen here today is if your Honor approves this settlement, looking at it from the point of the estate, we still have to go to the federal court to get approval. And, by the way, I suspect even approval of the federal court is really going to be no different. For example, if the federal court says it's fine, you can have the CharterCARE Community Board convey to you whatever interest there is, we are going to have to get that enforced. It's not going to be The reason we want that it's an self-enforced. additional piece of armor with regard to the fraudulent transfer claims that, by the way, the attorney general has known about for three months. We have been saying for three months that money belongs to us. This is no big shock. We filed a motion to intervene on June 18th saying that we want your Honor to vacate the order. the idea that this is all coming out of the blue is not fair.

By the way, I want to correct something. My brother said in his brief that if we ultimately succeed, we are going to emasculate or euthanize, I think was the word, CharterCARE Foundation because we're going to take \$8.2 million. I want it very clear that is what was transferred at the time. We believe we are entitled to

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the entire corpus of \$8.7 million. I don't have to leave that floating around. I say to your Honor flat out if your Honor approves this settlement on September 13th, we will not take the position that your Honor has said that CharterCARE Community Board is, in fact, the sole member and is entitled to do anything. We flat out said that it's disputed. So what we're buying is almost like a quit claim deed to property. The fact of the matter is there really is no standing.

Some of these arguments will relate -- I don't know when we're going to have the arguments for Prospect CharterCARE and for the attorney general, but the purpose of this -- you're hearing a receivership proceeding, your That's what this is. The purpose of the Honor. receivership, as I understand, is to maximum the assets for the estate and the estate here is literally the retirement plan. That is what was put into the receivership and as a practical matter the plan is really the over 2,700 participants. The purpose, as I understand the receivership, is not to protect debtors or punitive debtors who come in to the court and say, you know, let's litigate here within the receivership whether or not we owe them money or not. That is going to be litigated sometime down the line.

The other reason there is no standing is this is all

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completely contingent on whether or not the federal court approves this. Your Honor can say I think this is good for the estate, good for the plan. We go to federal court. This is a class action and the federal court can hear whatever it wants to hear and say forget about it. This may never come to pass.

I also want to point out, your Honor, the issue raised about -- I want to supplement the record. In my submission Exhibit 9 where I based my statement that they gave away \$210,000 and spent in administrative expenses 254. If your Honor looks at that exhibit, there is an entry under expenditures for \$200,000, which needs to be explained. And I would like to submit to your Honor a copy of the document that was furnished to us by CharterCARE Foundation as part of the discovery. It's CharterCARE Foundation 0006804, and basically what it says is that the \$200,000 that was given to Rhode Island Foundation is not a charitable expenditure, and, therefore, my numbers that I gave you are correct, but I would like to submit this so there is no issue about it.

THE COURT: That's fine. Madam Clerk, if you would mark that.

THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor.

MR. WISTOW: The bottom line, your Honor, and I think this is important. I think our fundamental issue

is what is the purpose of this hearing and it's really is there standing and so forth. But I can't help but tell your Honor that we have submitted documents to show you how meritless the accusations, the allegations, are that are being made here. For example, on October 30, 2014 -- by the way, the Articles of Incorporation of CharterCARE Foundation to this minute as we speak, their public records show that CharterCARE Community Board is the sole member. That's what you will find when you go to the Secretary of State and look at the articles as of today.

Now, here is how cynical CharterCARE Foundation has been. On October 30, 2014, this is in our exhibits, the board of CharterCARE Foundation sought to amend the bylaws to say that CharterCARE Foundation will be the sole member. That is to substitute CharterCARE Foundation for the CharterCARE Community Board. Those bylaws were supposed to be amended on October 30, 2014. When CharterCARE came in on the cy press to your Honor, three months later, the very first thing they said in their petition was that CharterCARE Community Board was the sole member.

They also told the attorney general in their applications that CharterCARE Community Board would be the sole member and submitted during the application process the articles and the bylaws showing it. But then

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they adopted in October different bylaws even though they told you three months later that CharterCARE Community Board was, in fact, the sole member and this is all in exhibits.

So what do we have? We have regardless of that vote, the law in Rhode Island is absolutely clear.

7-6-16, regarding nonprofit organizations, if there is any inconsistency between the bylaws and the articles, the articles control. Those not a surprising result.

I want to say very briefly on the abandonment question. We addressed the Schroeder case and the Raulston case, which are the only two cases relied on by the encyclopedias and the treatises which my brother cites, which stand for very general propositions. In Schroeder, by the way, which is a Washington State case, the bylaws of a nonprofit said flat out if you don't pay your dues, member, you forfeit your interest in the entity. So you forfeit your interest if the entity splits up in owning any of the property. That's not a very surprising result. That's what that case expressly stands for and we discussed it.

In <u>Raulston</u>, there was grazing land that was used by a nonprofit corporation. The grazing land was purchased by a nonprofit with a loan from the federal housing firm and in case of default, the land would be lost. The

members who used the grazing land were required to pay dues so that they could pay the mortgage. And that was provided for in the bylaws. They didn't to it, and they lost their interest. That has nothing to do with what we're talking about. The Ninth Circuit, however, in 1981, in Owyfee Grazing Association, 637 F.2d 694, it's a 1981 case, flat out said you need "Clear unequivocal decisive act by the abandoning party." We don't have anything like that. We have the exact opposite and what we got here is let's destroy anything we can and delay this situation.

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Your Honor, when we go to federal court, if we're fortunate enough and your Honor approves this, we are under the terms of the settlement agreement to file a motion with the federal court within five business days of your Honor's approval and there is a response due within 14 days thereafter. It's completely up to the Court, obviously, when to schedule the hearing for that. So I can't predict what will happen except I don't believe it will be a week after the 14 days are up. The schedule for hearing will simply be for preliminary approval. If the federal court grants preliminary approval, then we have to schedule a hearing for final approval, which cannot be sooner than 90 days after three month after the preliminary approval and we have to give

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notice under CAFA, the Class Action Fairness Act, to every attorney general of the United States where there is a planned participant.

So I guess what I'm saying, your Honor, is your Honor's decision saying this is good or reasonable for the plan in no way binds -- I'm going to say it on the record now and I will be confronted if I try to get out of this. I'm saying right now if this is approved, we will not take the position that your Honor has instructed CCCB, CharterCARE Community Board, to transfer this to us and that will have the affect that we would like it to have. It's free for them to fight about all these things.

By the way, the A.G.'s comments, which was quoted by Mr. Conn, he says that his concern that this is going to violate one of the conditions that the A.G. imposed, and he specifically refers to the A.G. who took care of this. Condition number two, this is the decision allowing the 2014 conversion, and I quote, "There shall be no board or officer overlap between or among the Prospect entities and the CCHP Foundation, CCHP, and the Heritage Hospitals." I promise you if you look at what we have agreed to, there is not going to be any overlap of officers or directors in any way, shape, or form. That objection is on its face unavailing. By the same token,

and I shouldn't really get into, well, I will anyway, the attorney general says he is concerned about another condition and that's reason number eight about there being a proposed cy pres petition satisfactory to the attorney general promptly filed after this. This was done, but I hope the attorney general is not suggesting that merely because the parties submit cy press to the Court that there is some automatic approval by the court, and we discovered, we believe, since then that the cy pres petition did not accurately present to the Court what the facts were.

So for all these reasons, and I reserve the right to comment further if we are going to hear the other objections, that the bottom line is your Honor's charge is, I believe, is to maximize the result for the Receiver. And you know what, your Honor, the most eloquent, the most eloquent evidence that we have done that is the objections from these people. That shows you that if we've somehow prejudiced them, which I suggest we have not, good for us, good for the plan, good for the estate. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Counsel, let me kind of take it back to the beginning. I understand also all the arguments, but the bottom line request, if I strip it down, is there is a motion on for nine day's notice. It's 10 day's notice

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if the Court signs the omnibus form. We had another hearing on for that day, and if the hearing gets continued out for several weeks because what I'm hearing is what we have a large binder of settlement documents. We need to go through and submit our papers. The Court may say yay or nay. What is the prejudice to the receivership estate? Is it purely time?

MR. WISTOW: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. Counsel.

Your Honor, I would just like to make MR. CONN: some brief points. I know you heard enough. The math that he keeps bringing up that suggests that CharterCARE Foundation is not running itself efficiently. That first year they were waiting for cy pres money. They were gearing up and getting their operations going. If you look at the most recent years, I'm doing this from memory, they take in about \$500,000 a year mostly from the Rhode Island fund and they're running about \$150,000 in expenses. This is before they got hit with legal fees with all of the litigation. That's the normal ratio is about 150 out of 500 goes to their expenses. So Mr. Wistow is so mistaken to suggest there is some mismanagement of charitable assets.

The other issue very briefly and that is Mr. Wistow makes a statement that the money does not belong to you.

We disagree with that, obviously. We are holding it under an order from this Court, a valid order, and it does belong to us. It doesn't belong to us. We administer it as a trustee-type steward for charitable purposes. We understand he has a claim against it and he's saying they're creditors with a priority under the statutes. When you read the briefing on that, as I know your Honor has, there are big issues here, probably appellate issues, quite frankly. That's where it should be decided who owns the money. It should be done fairly and by judicial decision, not by fiat because they put it in a settlement agreement.

THE COURT: But, counsel, reading through your papers and reading through Attorney Wistow's, I understand the money is going to go and the sky is falling. But isn't what the settlement, and I haven't had a chance to go through it line by line, basically saying that the receivership estate is going to step into the shoes of whatever rights or liabilities they may have and they have contested. They are just as part of the settlement taking over that interest but not necessarily a lot of the issues, and I understand it's kind of at first blush to be raised, but not that they're necessarily going to be able to do it. They're just taking that. Am I incorrect there?

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MR. CONN: Well, I think it starts with your judicial approval. That becomes Exhibit A to the federal court position and they're off and running. If it's in the illegal settlement to include that in there, this Court ought not to approve it.

THE COURT: I guess that's my question. If what we're talking about is taking the interest of the settlement party and transferring it over as part of the settlement to the receivership estate, doesn't that give the receivership whatever right and interest they may have had? I'm trying to understand --

MR. CONN: I think it's illegal to begin with because the charitable foundation has a charitable purpose to administer these funds according to the mission, according to this Court's cy pres order. This is sort of referenced in the attorney general's brief filing today. You know, the federal court may or may not get into that. I respectfully submit your Honor should not put this Court's seal of approval on something that would substitute Mr. Del Sesto with now arguing that he's the sole member and he basically controls the assets of CharterCARE Foundation.

THE COURT: I guess we may be able to deal with that another time. Isn't that what is normal in both receivership or bankruptcy law with the trustees? You

step in the shoes of what they have, rights and interests, and they may be able to assert it. I'm just trying to understand what you're claiming has been abandoned or whatever else in a settlement agreement and taking that on gives them any more rights.

MR. CONN: I don't think your Honor would want to approve something that is tainted by illegality.

THE COURT: So you're saying the Court should first make the determination whether they have a right to use it for some purpose?

MR. CONN: I think the Court should determine whether it's legal for CCCB to transfer a sole membership interest to a receivership that is standing in the shoes of a pension. That's a straight issue of law and this Court ought not to approve the settlement within the legal term. It's as simple as that.

THE COURT: So what you're saying is what you believe is in violation of the law is not necessarily the use of that interest but the transfer itself.

MR. CONN: Yes. If I could just pass up to the Court Rhode Island General Laws 23-17.14-22. Again, I was trying to walk a fine line over there, not arguing the merits.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm just trying to understand at the end of the day is there a controversy.

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MR. CONN: And I believe there is. May I pass this up?

(Document handed to the Court.)

Again, I would like an opportunity to MR. CONN: brief this and develop this but this says, "Distribution of proceeds from acquisition - selection and establishment of an independent foundation." And then Section A says, "In the event of the approval of a hospital conversion involving a not-for-profit corporation and a for-profit corporation results in a new entity as provided," et cetera. That is exactly what we have here. "It shall be required that the proceeds from the sale and any endowments, restricted, unrestricted, and specific purpose funds" -- and that's what we're talking about here, the cy pres. All the unrestricted funds stay with the hospitals and what is left is being swept into the settlement. We're talking about restricted and specific purpose funds -- "shall be transferred to a charitable foundation operated by the board of directors." And it says about an independent foundation.

Clearly, the intent of that, and I think it's in the attorney general's papers, people like Mr. McQueen who are stewards of charitable funds to give those out consistent with their mission and the intent of the

original donor. To put them in the hands of the Receiver and have the Receiver with a claim to that, we feel violates Rhode Island law and we would like an opportunity to brief that and suggest to the Court that the Court ought not approve the settlement that potentially puts them in a driver's seat that they don't have a right to be in.

THE COURT: Briefly.

MR. WISTOW: Your Honor, not to be repetitive, we're saying again we stipulate that if your Honor approves this, we are not saying that anything here was valid.

Now, Mr. Conns, unfortunately, has taken the wind out of my sail in some respect by introducing the statute. I was going to bring this up later in the federal court.

The statute that he gives to your Honor, he reads you paragraph (a). He doesn't read you paragraph (b).

Paragraph (b), "The presiding justice of the Superior Court shall have the authority to appoint the initial board of director." That was not done. That is another violation.

THE COURT: Counsel, I also received this afternoon the emergency motion by Prospect to postpone. Are you prepared to address that at this point?

MR. WISTOW: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: That would be fine. The Court will

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issue its ruling at the end, but why don't we proceed with Attorney Halprin.

Thank you, your Honor. MR. HALPRIN: Halprin for Prospect Medical Holdings and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. Your Honor, I listened to the argument here today and it appears that we have really gone into the merits of the issues that will come before the Court at the time of the approval process, and I think that the issue you heard today is just one of the issues that are going to have to be grappled with by the Mr. Wistow is an extremely able and zealous advocate and I fully understand why he wants to see this go as quickly as possible for the benefit of his clients. But the Court on the other hand has a judicial responsibility under the statute to judicially approve this. And in looking at this, the number of parties and the number of issues and the potential impact, it seems that the Court ought to permit a sufficient amount of time for the parties to fully comprehend, brief, and respond to some very, very complex issues and that's what the motions are about today. It's not about the merits. It's about the timeline.

In the papers, the settlement document itself, Mr. Wistow says that he had a lengthy and intensive negotiation, arm's length negotiation, paragraph 37.

And, clearly, they are ready to go and are well prepared for the hearing, but it came as a complete surprise to all of the other parties who have not had the benefit of weeks and weeks to anticipate, prepare, and be able to turn out a 20-page brief while we were at the same time preparing motions to dismiss in the federal court that happen to be due on the 14th of September. This is about a fair opportunity for the parties to present their case to the Court and for the Court to have all the necessary information where there are such complex issues involved.

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What I did in my submission, your Honor, is try to flag what I think are some very difficult issues, and I want to say at the outset that the Prospect entities are not opposed to all aspects of the settlement. simply opposed to certain provisions which we think are overreaching on the part of the Receiver and do not even belong in the settlement agreement. One of the statutory provisions of the settlement statute, which is 23-17.14, is that the settlement does not exhibit collusion. There are provisions in the settlement agreement that cause us to want more information. Why is it necessary in this settlement agreement for the settling parties to not only admit liability but to agree on a \$125 million in damages and then to say they think their proportionate share is small among the various defendant parties. That

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sounds to me like an effort to position for the future rather than something that is necessary or relevant to a financial settlement. So we think that there is things here that need to get a much closer look by the Court and not be decided on a nine-day notice.

The issue with respect to the non-profit I'm not going to go into because you heard that extensively.

But, clearly, there is a very important issue there that needs to be heard and the attorney general and the other parties certainly want to have the opportunity to do that.

From the Prospect entity's prospective there is another issue which is there is an entity, there is an agreement there, which is an amended restated operating It's not actually called an operating agreement. It's an amended restated limited liability agreement. company agreement of Prospect CharterCARE, LLC. agreement if approved by the Court, this settlement agreement would be allowing the party to violate that Transfers of interest are pursuant to that agreement. agreement. Would the Court be suggesting that that agreement has no import by approving this and now the transfer takes place and now we have another lawsuit about whether the transfer was appropriate, and does the Court's stamp of approval mean that issue has now been

resolved? Maybe that falls into the same category as the last issue when Mr. Wistow was saying maybe it doesn't have that affect. But the Court ought not to be comparing the contractual relationship of the parties without a full hearing and an opportunity to understand exactly where that leads us.

So the long and short of it is, your Honor. We just need time. We need time to develop the record, submit the memos, and do the research, and for the Court to conduct a proper hearing and decide whether to judicially approve this under the statute. In my papers, your Honor, I asked for the opportunity to conduct discovery on whether or not there is some collusion involved by these very unusual provisions finding their way into a settlement where there is ongoing unrelated litigation amongst these parties. It looks like an attempt to gain an advantage and we don't think the Court should participate in that by approving it in its current form. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. WISTOW: I think the key to what Mr. Halprin said is he described himself as one of the parties. He is not one of the parties. This is not the ultimate litigation. You can see he's trying to make it so. Is this Court going to start getting into an inquiry as to

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whether or not under the original acquisition agreement there can be an assignment? You can see your Honor is going to end up trying 90 percent of the issues that are ultimately going to be the issue in the federal court I said it before and I'll say it again. Honor allows the settlement, we are not going to take the position that your Honor has approved the form of relief on the basis that there is no collusion involved. If he wants to say there is collusion, let him say it in the federal court where ultimately -- and let him ask the federal court for discovery. Your Honor, we're not just talking about prejudice of time. Now, he wants to start deposing us and sending requests for production. there collusion? I don't know what collusion means. don't want to sound like Rudy Guiliani. Okay, but I will tell you this, did we work together? Did the Plaintiffs and the Defendants work together and come to an agreement? Absolutely. Am I supposed to give Mr. Land part of whatever fee we get here? No. So, yes, we worked together. Can your Honor see where there is going, the request that is being made here?

I said it once and I will say it again. If there is any violation of the agreement, the acquisition agreement, that's a problem that we're going to have ultimately enforcing the terms of this. He also said

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that the settlement relates to ongoing unrelated I have no idea what that could possibly litigation. The litigation in federal court couldn't be more That's what we're talking about settlement. related. are asking for permission from this Court to allow the Receiver to go into federal court and settle that litigation as to the settling Defendants. Some of the stuff that we got here is just wild. The submission by Prospect says, for example, there is an agreement by CCCB to turn over to the Receiver more than a \$11 million in cash that is currently available to fund the nonprofit programs and grants and offered by CCCB to the Rhode Island community. This is like nonsense. What we have here is a fundamental lack of understanding of what is going on and what we're asking for.

Your Honor, it may be tempting to say what harm is there in another three-week delay. The problem is I think your Honor should be focused on do these people have standing to get into these things or don't they? And as to the issues that my brother said he wants to litigate, he wants to litigate in front of you whether there is a violation of the hospital acquisition agreement. He said that flat out. We will be here for years. So I respectfully ask your Honor to just focus on that. Do they have standing? If they do, I agree three

weeks is not a big deal. It's going to hurt the 2,700 people. They are going to be anxious. But in fairness to the Court, I have to admit it's not a big deal. On the other hand, if they don't have standing and that's the issue, then there is no reason.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Anything further counsel?

MR. HALPRIN: I want to say one thing, your Honor, I neglected to mention one important point. That is we do believe that there is an implication with the Hospital Conversion Act. I put that in my papers and the Department of Health really needs to also be considered that we've got an administrative decision as to whether the voting rights need to be for this Prospect entity and they may be impacted by this decision and I think the Court should take that into account.

THE COURT: We heard a lot this afternoon about some of the arguments and the potential arguments. The Court takes very seriously its responsibility to determine whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable and for the benefit of the receivership estate. I had told Attorney Wistow and Attorney Del Sesto as we were going through the -- I'll call it in the investigative part of the proceeding, and I told all the pensioners here in attendance, that it's better to take the time to make

sure that we get it right.

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I started to go through the binder of materials on the agreement and reviewing the papers, and while I understand that this may take time I want to be very clear that there may be issues at the hearing in terms of standing that the Court dismisses all of it out of hand. There may be argument in there that the Court doesn't necessarily have to get to and I understand that. But I am going to allow a short continuance to allow the parties to submit their papers so we can have a full hearing with respect to the settlement and whether the Court should approve it under the statute.

Again, the last thing I want is to tie this case up further with writs or other things because counsel believes they didn't have time. However, in doing that, the Court wants to make it clear to all parties that the Court is going to mark this hearing a date certain so the papers will be in and we'll hear the hearing.

With respect to the motion of Prospect Medical
Holdings and others, this Court denies outright the
relief requested in Subsection (b) in terms of discovery
that is denied. The Court will move this, and I made
sure the Court can set aside as much of the day as
possible, if needed, to the 10th of October in this
courtroom. I am going to ask the parties and I

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understand they couldn't agree on these motions to endeavor to get the Court a scheduling order. I want to make sure that I have all the papers in hand so we can have a productive hearing and I can review them. will be several days and possibly a week. I understand there is some vacation schedules that we can work around. We're going to fill up some of this time with what may have been a delay of the Court hearing the hearing and being able to issue a decision so the Court can make sure that it's not only up to speed, but based on the statutory requirements for the approval or this approval, the Court will be in a position where it can go forward at that point. The hearing on the request for approval on the 13th is continued to October 10th. The motion to intervene that is currently pending for the 13th will go forward as scheduled.

So as far as the clerk is concerned for the record, the Court is going to grant CharterCARE Foundation's request for a continuance and also the motion of Prospect Medical Holdings, the Court will grant the continuance in Section (a) of the request for relief and Section (b) for discovery is denied at this time. Counsel.

MR. WISTOW: Your Honor, please, based on my experience during the investigation of this I implore your Honor not to ask us to agree on a briefing schedule

1 but that you impose one on us.

THE COURT: You know what, it's probably easier. At the end of the day I know when I need the papers. I will send out an order tomorrow, actually it will be on Tuesday or Wednesday to the parties. I will send it out there. If I don't get an objection within 24 hours, I will enter it, and if there is, I will look at it.

Again, my main goal is to get the papers in time, and we're going out about 30 days, so that I can review it. I know as far as CharterCARE Foundation, we have other counsel and local counsel but I am certainly willing to work around your schedule if I need to review some of those things.

MR. CONN: Thank you, your Honor. With that in mind, it would be helpful for me if our initial briefing was due perhaps on the third, a week before. That would give me at least three days back from the United States.

MR. WISTOW: We would like to reply, your Honor. I would like to accommodate my brother. I promise not to call ICE and tell them you're trying to get back in the country, but in all fairness --

THE COURT: I will send out a schedule that you can reply and also the Court can have some time. Thank you very much. The Court is in recess.

(ADJOURNED.)