STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND	PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, Sc.	SUPERIOR COURT
ST. JOSEPH HEALTH SERVICES OF RHODE ISLAND, INC.	) ) )
VS.	) ) C.A. No: PC/2017-3856 )
ST. JOSEPH HEALTH SERVICES OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT PLAN, ET AL.	) ) )

## MOTION TO COMPEL

# HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUSTICE BRIAN P. STERN ON: WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2017

#### APPEARANCES:

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALS JESSICA RIDER, ESQ. KATHRYN ENRIGHT, ESQFOR THE STATE

## CERTIFICATION

I, Jennifer W. Milette, hereby certify that the succeeding pages, 1 through 57, inclusive, are a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes.

JENNIFER W. MILETTE, RPR Certified Official Court Reporter

### WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2017 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 Madam Clerk, please call the case. THE COURT: 3 Your Honor, the matter before the Court THE CLERK: 4 is case number PC/2017-3856, St. Joseph's Health Services 5 of Rhode Island versus St. Joseph Health Services 6 Retirement Plan. This matter is on for a motion to 7 compel compliance with subpoena and to overrule an objection. Will counsel please identify themselves for the 10 record? 11 MS. RIDER: Jessica Rider on behalf of the state of 12 Rhode Island. 13 MS. ENRIGHT: Good afternoon. Kate Enright for the 14 15 Department of Attorney General. MR. CAVANAGH: Good afternoon, your Honor. Joseph 16 Cavanaugh for Prospect CharterCare LLC. 17 MR. DEL SESTO: Stephen Del Sesto, the 18 court-appointed receiver. 19 MR. WISTOW: Max Wistow, special counsel. 2.0 THE COURT: As the clerk stated, we are here this 21 afternoon for a motion to compel on the subpoena that was 22 issued by the special counsel. The Court has had the 23 opportunity to review the papers, including the November 24 16 partial objection by the Attorney General's office; 25

the November 17th special counsel motion to overrule partial objection and compel a response; November 27 Office of Attorney General objection to the motion to compel; and on November 28, the Court received by hand delivery the special counsel's reply. The motion was set down to be heard this afternoon.

Counsel, you may proceed.

MR. WISTOW: Thank you, your Honor.

As is well known to the Court, the pension plan that we are talking about today was put into receivership on August 18th. At the time there was a request by the petitioner St. Joseph's Hospital to reduce all the benefits of the plan participants by 40 percent. The Court has deferred any decision in that regard until at least the first of February. I refer to that because it relates to the immediacy of some of the things we are asking for.

We were appointed special counsel to the engagement on October 18. And on November 3, we served the subpoena in question on the Attorney General. So there's nearly a month has gone by. And we have received literally not one document in compliance with the subpoena.

I would point out, your Honor, the irony of the situation. Because within less than a week of the petitioner receivership in August, the Attorney General

put out a press release. The Attorney General, being my opposition this morning. So on August 24, this press release — and that appears by the way as footnote number three in the memo, the initial memo we put in.

And he said at that time that "He was urging the receiver of the pension fund and the Court to establish and maintain complete transparency throughout this process and to consider every available option to regain financial viability of the pension fund."

So, not only has there been no effort by the Attorney General's office to help us in our inquiry. But as recently as -- I guess it was on Monday, our office has been accused expressly of acting in bad faith regarding filing the motion. And that bad faith was based on a supposed agreement which was attached as Exhibit B to the objection.

Purposefully, purposefully, I -- I don't like to be this vehement, except I want to defend myself against the charge of bad faith. Purposefully the Attorney General's representatives left out my response the very next day to that letter, where I said flat out, "We find much of the letter," the letter that they based this supposed agreement on, "from Ms. Potington (phonetic) to be factually and legally inaccurate."

The tenure of our meeting has led us to believe, and

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the November 16 letter reinforces that belief, that we must file a motion to compel. We have no agreement whatever with the Attorney General's office in spite of their representations. And by the way, Rule 1.4 of the Superior Court Rules of Practice would require any such agreement to be in writing, which it's not.

Now, the Attorney General asks in its submission to this Court, among other things, to extend compliance with the subpoena to February 15th, 2018. And I'd like to quote what -- the reason given by the Attorney General. The Attorney General says that "He is aware that the receiver intends to propose pension benefit adjustments in February 2018. Extending the time for the Attorney General to respond to the subpoena will not interfere with the receiver's proposal, which will be developed based on the information currently available concerning pension resources and the status of plan participants. The investigation to be conducted by special counsel and the pursuit of any claims by special counsel will not be concluded by February 2018."

It would make sense that if any damages would come available for the benefit of the pension, those funds could be ejected into the corpus and the receiver's proposal adjusted accordingly at the time.

Now, let me say first that I agree that the chances

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of us recovering funds by February first are remote to say the least. On the other hand, we are beginning to get a handle on some potential claims, where I hope with additional information to be able to advise the receiver in connection with whether or not to do a reduction at that time; to perhaps put it off a little bit further; or alternatively, to do a reduction at a smaller percentage than otherwise might be.

On the basis of I'm saying, "Look. Here's what I found, Mr. Receiver. Here's where I think we are going to have a recovery." And, of course, no lawyer is ever going to guarantee any results. But he can take into consideration my recommendations. And this will have potentially a very material effect on the pensions and the plan participants.

So, the arguments that AG makes, he says he's not a party. He's not a party. And, therefore, he should not have the same kind of burdens that a party would have to the litigation.

But we should compare that, your Honor, with the statement that I read, where he talks about the total transparency; and he wants every available option to be exercised by the Court and special counsel to get the financial viability of the plan in place.

But more important than that, your Honor, this is

not some third party. You know, he's a public official.

We are talking about duties he had with regard to this transaction. And this is not some stranger that we've

grabbed in and pulled into this mix.

And by the way, I'd like to quote the Court a little bit further from the Attorney General's statement on August 24th, less than a week after the receivership, to show what commitment he is supposed to make to this proceeding, and which he apparently refuses to do. And this is a direct quote from his press release. He says, "I am very concerned and have many questions as to how the pension fund could be insolvent just three years after being funded at 90 percent."

While the Attorney General's office is not directly or indirectly involved with the management of the pension fund, "We have engaged with counsel for the petitioner and the court-appointed receiver," which is not true; he never engaged with me, "and will be closely monitoring the legal process and assessing where we have legal standing to intervene."

He's not a stranger to this proceeding. He goes on to say, "The men and women who dedicated their careers working in St. Joe's expected that their pension would be there for them when they retired. And rightfully so.

Many, if not most, live on fixed incomes and depend on

that monthly pension check to survive.

"Just as state employee pensioners know all too well, it can be devastating to see your monthly income decrease precipitously because of broken promises. These retirees deserve to know how this happened and what is being done to protect that investment. I urge the receiver of the pension fund," and so on, that I quoted before. That is his publicly stated position.

When he gets into court here, not only doesn't he do anything, but he says, "Don't treat me as if I'm a party to this proceeding." Now, he goes on, and he argues that he shouldn't have to produce any of the documents that are on his website. "These are publicly available documents," he says. And all we need to do is click on and there we are.

Two problems with that. The case he cites for that proposition is one of the very small minority. We've cited on page three of our reply memo the cases that represent the overwhelming rule in the United States under the Federal Rules which our Rhode Island rules follow. For example, in the <a href="Ari v. Archon Information">Ari v. Archon Information</a> case from the Eastern District of Louisiana in 2012, the Court said, and I quote, "Further, the Court notes that Ari is not absolved of her duty to produce information or documents simply because they are publicly available.

Especially whereas here the documents are reasonably accessible and within Ari's possession. Moreover, this obligation extends equally to third parties responding to subpoenas as well as to litigants." That's the <a href="In re Refco">In re Refco</a> case from the Northern District of Illinois that I cite, plus the other cases.

But more important, your Honor, than who's going to click the button, is the fact that his website is not reliable. It is not complete. There's an affidavit that we submitted to the Court for Mr. Ledsome (phonetic) showing that there is at least one document that we were lucky enough to obtain from some other source. That's not on the website.

And that's specifically the response to supplemental questions that were submitted in support of the application for 2014. Now we were just lucky that we had that. If we had just -- were stuck with the representation of the Attorney General --

THE COURT: Why -- why don't we, on that issue, just go into it more after the AG has the ability. Because when I read their last objection, I don't know whether or not they are pressing that any more. And I will clarify that with them and we can take that.

MR. WISTOW: Okay. Then they go on to talk about relevance. And they say, "Well, you know, we will give

you everything that relates to the pension fund that we think relates to the pension fund."

And we have two problems with that. Number one is the so-called confidentiality aspect of it. And just to, to -- that list or the so-called confidential material appears as Exhibit 3 in the materials that we most recently filed with the Court.

Now, what's astonishing about this, your Honor — and I don't know how else to categorize it — is the first eight items on that list are minutes of the board's and committee meetings of the hospitals to approve the very transaction that we are looking at, and include conflict of interest disclosures. Conflict of interest disclosures. Those are supposedly confidential.

Now, even more bizarre, your Honor, on page seven, they're claiming that confidentiality applies to an -- to "an expert report analyzing and evaluating the pension plan." It's mind-boggling that they could claim in this context confidentiality. Two items down from that on page seven, there's an entry "Information relating to employee retirement plan. Confidential."

Page eight, "Financial supplement to pension information provided previously." All claim to be confidential.

Now, they rely on their claim for confidentiality on the Hospital Conversion Act itself. And in Rhode Island

General Law 23-17-14-32, it's true that the Attorney General -- it says, "The Attorney General has the power to decide whether any information required by this chapter of an applicant is confidential and/or proprietary. The decisions by the Attorney General shall be made prior to any public notice of an initial application or any public review of any information and shall be binding on the Attorney General, the Department of Health, and all experts or consultants engaged by the Attorney General or the Department of Health."

But the very next statute after that clarifies what that means. And that's 23-17.14-32A, which we quoted in our papers. And it makes it clear that what they are talking about is that all other portions of "initial application and supporting documentation shall be considered public records and shall be available for inspection upon request." In other words, the stuff that's deemed confidential is not susceptible to an APRA request. And we are not arguing to the contrary.

However, the 23-17.14-34A, which we also quote, gives your Honor the authority to open up and review those documents and order them disclosed. The statute says, "Any preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency, act or ruling with respect to the filing of an application for conversion, including the completeness of

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the application, confidentiality of any information or documents produced in connection with the conversion of approval or disapproval of a conversion, and conditions or restrictions proposed or determined with respect to the approval of a proposed conversion is immediately reviewable via this Court."

So this is exactly the analogy between APRA, the Access to Public Records Act that we have in this state and FOIA, the Freedom of Information Act under the federal law. And I would cite to your Honor a case from the Southern District of Georgia, 2015, which the United States Willis v. Southerncare, which we cited. And I quote, "FOIA determinations and decisions to quash a subpoena are two different analytical animals driven by different considerations. Put differently, for subpoenas, the presence of confidential commercial information counsels caution and concern for the disclosing parties' business interests. But it does not compel quashing as in FOIA."

So, I agree with the Attorney General that if a citizen, taxpayer just wrote in and asked for this, he could maintain confidentiality. But that's all.

Now, he also goes on -- by the way, Mr. Cavanagh is here. He introduced himself to me as representing Prospect Care. And he has some concerns about confidentiality

from Prospect.

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And I offer now to enter into an agreement with him - if it's okay with -- if it's okay with the Court - to not disclose any information that he considers to be confidential. He will give it to me, without my first giving notice to him that I intend to go to the Court for permission to disclose it. And I'm willing to be held under contempt of court if I violate that.

THE COURT: But the Attorney General in their papers - I will hear from them - really posited two issues -two things in terms of confidentiality. One is, it's their position that, look, if you get a waiver from parties, you can put that aside. But the second is, is almost for the Prospect documents where you are talking about is, if the Court orders some type of protective order, that's in place, at least until they can be reviewed and possibly you coming back into court and the Court making a determination in terms of where they should be.

That's what I'm offering, if I MR. WISTOW: understood what your Honor is saying.

Not just with respect to Prospect. THE COURT: there's other documents that have been labeled confidential.

MR. WISTOW: I have no problem with that, your

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Honor. The standard procedure -- we are talking about commercial information.

THE COURT: Right. Uh-huh.

MR. WISTOW: I also will warrant to the Court -- I have no plans to open a hospital in Rhode Island. So the information is not going to be of any particular use to me. We -- we can arrive at an appropriate protective agreement.

The next point I want to address — I will try not to drag this out — is the relevance. And the AG wants to say they are going to give me everything they think is relevant to the pension. And they are going to decide what's relevant. And I don't accept that.

And I will tell you exactly why I don't accept that. First of all, in -- if this were in a suit, an ordinary suit, the standard is not relevance. It's whether or not it's discoverable if it might lead to relevant evidence. But this is a broader situation. This is not a lawsuit. I've been charged with the obligation of investigating what happened here. And I would like to look at everything.

What I can say -- I don't rely -- I would not rely on the AG's "determination" because the AG really has shown both in the filing in this Court and in its decision that it has no fundamental understanding of the

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transaction. They miscategorized the transaction in their footnote seven to their objection, where they talked about the -- "In its simplest form, the structure of the transaction outlined in the initial application is a sale of the assets of CharterCare Health Partners to PMH." That's not so. That's not what happened. That's how frightening it is to have to rely on the Attorney General's categorization of what's important and what's not.

Now, by the way, that -- what I just picked out I don't regard to be a quibble. The difference between who is the purchaser, who is the seller. That has very significant potential ramifications in evaluating this entire transaction. The consideration for the sale. For example; what was the allocation between the two hospitals? Between Roger -- that's what was sold, the assets of the hospital not the assets of CharterCare. There's no allocation that we know of yet as to how much of this was for the assets of Roger Williams.

This all leads, your Honor, to a possible claim of fraudulent transfer. In the face of obligations owed to these -- I'm not saying I'm going to bring that suit.

But if I'm going to look into this, I need to understand these things.

And by the way, just so your Honor understands that

I'm not completely fancifying this. One thing I can show 1 you - and I have showed you the papers I hope - is the 2 Attorney General either was completely misled when he 3 approved this application or concealed something. 4 what I'm referring to is in his decision, he flat out 5 says that "PMH is proposing to form Prospect CharterCare 6 PMH will retain an 85 percent ownership interest in 7 Prospect CharterCare LLC. CCHP will be provided a 15 percent ownership." That's all true. 9 Then it says though, "The governing structure, 10 however, will be such" -- (phone ringing) 11 Oh, my goodness. I forgot to shut that off. 12 Forgive me, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Nice ring tone. 14 I remember when cellphones first came 15 MR. WISTOW: I was in a trial in front of Judge Torres, and 16 opposing counsel's cellphone went off. And when it went 17 off, it should have been a lesson to me, but your 18 reaction was a lot milder than Judge Torres --19 THE COURT: I want to put the cellphone behind us. 20 And let's keep going. 21 MR. WISTOW: Okay. 22 Let me make sure it doesn't do that again. 23 (Pause) 24 So, what -- the importance of this is the Attorney 25

General says in his decision — and I submit this is completely wrong — "The governing structure however," this is of the new joint venture, "will be such that PMH's ownership interest will appoint 50 percent of the membership of the Prospect CharterCare LLC," that's the new for-profit entity, the joint venture, "and CCHP's ownership interest. CCHP," being the entity that owned Roger Williams Hospital and St. Joseph's, "will appoint 50 percent of the membership of the proposed CharterCare LLC board. The transacting parties refer to this concept as a 50/50 board.

"Prospect CharterCare LLC would operate under a 50/50 board composition, which would permit CCHP to retain a significant degree of control in the ongoing ownership and governors of Prospect CharterCare LLC to ensure the continuance of its local mission as well as to provide it with access to the capital and other resources held by PMH," et cetera, et cetera.

The president of CharterCare Health Partners, the selling entity, which was going to become a 15-percent owner of the new joint venture and the president of Prospect, the acquiring company, submitted a press release which appeared in The Providence Journal before the Attorney General approved the transaction where both of them categorize the 50/50 board as ensuring local

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control over the hospital by giving CharterCare "real veto powers." That is completely false. Completely false.

And I would like to read you the entire statement.

Not the entire but a portion of the statement that appeared in the Journal. "The development and pursuit of innovation and health delivery should not come at the cost of one of the most cherished values in Rhode Island healthcare: that of local control. We are pleased that our proposal will assure preservation of local governance as our joint venture board will have equal representation from CharterCare and Prospect with a local board chair with real veto powers."

Your Honor, I submitted as Exhibit 4 that statement by the presidents of the two entities where they touted this. And that was one of the important considerations, obviously, in allowing this whole transaction to go through.

But the problem with that statement, even though there's four directors from the CCHP and four from the for-profit, if there's a deadlock, the agreements provide that the -- that the for-profit directors get to decide what to do in nearly every instance. So it's a sham.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. WISTOW: Now, I point this out for two reasons.

One -- and I admit that on its face it doesn't directly relate to the pension plan. But if I -- I may be able to, among other things that we found, piece all of this together to perhaps, perhaps, base some success on liability on Prospect. And also I point this out because, again, I don't want to have to rely on the Attorney General who is under the impression that obviously -- I hope he was under the impression and didn't conceal it. He was under the impression that there was local control when there was not.

So, that's really one of many, many issues. I offer that just as an example. I don't want to completely disclose everything we've come up with so far. But we want to flesh these things out. And our investigation at this point is really embryonic. But frankly, I'm encouraged that there will be a basis for doing something, if I can get the documents that I need.

By the way, one of the exhibits to the AG's submission trying to quash the subpoena, Exhibit E, is the decision itself. And I'm just -- there are multiple, multiple, multiple things that the Attorney General had to evaluate. One of them, for example, is whether the proposed conversion contemplates the appropriate and reasonable fair market value, meaning of the assets that were transferred. We really would like to explore that.

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Again, for the obvious thing about possibly a fraudulent transfer of assets for an inadequate consideration.

So, the -- the other thing that is a little bit bizarre is our subpoena asks the Attorney General to turn over to us those documents relating to his express statement to the press about broken promises; saying can you please give us the documents relating to that; and also the documents where he's relating to his "engagement with counsel for the receiver," which to my knowledge never took place.

I just want to say one thing in closing. And I promise, your Honor, this is in closing. I don't think there's any more eloquent argument that I can make to compel the disclosure of these documents than the Attorney General made himself on August 24th when he said, "I am very concerned and have many questions as to how the pension fund could be insolvent just three years after being funded at 90 percent." And then he goes on and he talks about the transparency and so forth. No one could be more eloquent in describing the need for this than the Attorney General. And it's ironic that I'm here trying to compel him to do what he publicly said was the right thing to do.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Counsel, before I hear from the state, I

just want to clarify something you said from the beginning. Have you received rolling or anything else, any documents in response from the Attorney General at this point?

MR. WISTOW: The only thing I've received is the list of confidential materials. That's it. And whether that was -- and that was generated, I believe but I'm not sure, way back when, several years ago. I'm quite sure. But that's the only thing.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Counsel, you may proceed.

MS. ENRIGHT: Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. ENRIGHT: Before we proceed, I just want to acknowledge what this case is about: the pensioners, and that the Attorney General is truly concerned for them and the status of the pension fund. Our goal today is to arrange for an orderly lawful response to this subpoena that will be most helpful to special counsel.

The Attorney General would like to specifically address three points that will get us to that place. First, we would like to provide production on a rolling basis with production to be completed by February 15th. Second, we would like the ability to withhold legally protected documents absent a waiver from the transacting

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parties to these reviews or a court order. Finally, we would like the ability to provide privilege logs.

So, first taking the time piece of this, your Honor. Special counsel has requested essentially all of the Attorney General's records and files pertaining to the 2009 Hospital Conversion Act reviews merging Roger Williams and St. Joe's into CharterCare Health Partners and secondly the 2014 Hospital Conversion Act review involving Prospect CharterCare.

We plan to give all of the documents that aren't legally protected for which we would provide privilege logs. We have attempted to demonstrate the volume and the breadth of the subject matter captured by the requests. There were no statutory criteria to these reviews that address the impact of the deals on the pension.

In 2014, there was one question in that 73-page application that specifically referenced the pension. And in 2009, of a 113-page application, there were two questions that specifically referenced the pension. If it is helpful, we can provide the documents responsive to these questions, subject to protection and privilege, within two weeks to commence our rolling production.

We will produce whatever the Court orders. But because compliance requires production of what we

estimate to be over 100,000 documents or more, the volume 1 of the request is a necessary consideration as we arrange 2 for an orderly and lawful response. 3 THE COURT: Counsel, can I just ask a question about 4 that? 5 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes. 6 I'd like to understand from November 3, 7 THE COURT: when you were served the subpoena until today, why don't 8 we start with has there been staff assigned to, to gather 9 together or identify the materials? 10 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes, of course, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: So, let's talk about that and FTEs or 12 13 whatever. MS. ENRIGHT: Sure. 14 I need to understand what happened 15 THE COURT: because I'm terribly concerned that there's been nothing 16 produced, and we are at almost the 30-day mark. 17 MS. ENRIGHT: Sure, sure. 18 Upon receipt of the subpoena, one of our initial 19 goals was to meet with special counsel and to immediately 2.0 organize our office in a way that could respond to this 21 subpoena. We have designated a full-time secretary. 22 We've got three attorneys assigned to this. We have a 23 room full of documents. We have certainly committed a 24 substantial amount of resources to compliance. 25

admittedly been tied up with some motion practice in the recent days. But we are in the process of preparing to produce.

Until the reply received yesterday evening, we had thought we had reached an agreement to do so on a rolling basis.

THE COURT: But whether it's rolling or not, I guess what I'm trying to understand and look at -- you wanted to have a meeting. There's a full-time FTE, which is a secretary, plus three attorneys that to some extent are working on this. So, what are you -- what do you have at this point? Is there a number of documents, a number -- have you identified everything that could come in within the scope of the subpoena?

And I'm putting electronic documents aside for this.

MS. ENRIGHT: Okay. So, we -- it's difficult for me to address that without first addressing the publicly available documents. So I am going to just quickly --

THE COURT: That's probably good because I saw a real shift in your papers.

MS. ENRIGHT: Yes. We are willing to provide the publicly available documents to special counsel's office. We had suggested because it has been -- business has been conducted this way in the past where parties will look to the publicly available documents.

THE COURT: And by the way, I appreciate you 1 mentioned Costa v. Rasch both in your papers. 2 in Westlaw or Lexis. I didn't see it as an exhibit. 3 MS. ENRIGHT: We should have attached it. I 4 apologize. 5 THE COURT: But putting that aside, it's not an 6 issue at this point because you are going to produce 7 them. 8 MS. ENRIGHT: We are going to -- we are going to 9 produce that. And just because I feel it necessary to 10 address the attack on the website, the CDC documents are 11 maintained by Department of Health. So Mr. Wistow's 12 exhibit does reference that there -- and his papers 13 reference that. That document was not available on our 14 website. 15 The change in effective control process is a 16 different process than the Hospital Conversions Act 17 process. Change in effective control is fully within the 18 jurisdiction of the Department of Health. We do not 19 maintain their records on our website. So that can be 20 found there, I would think. I don't know. 21 The bottom-line in terms of the Court's THE COURT: 22 decision is publicly available --23 MS. ENRIGHT: Exactly. 24 THE COURT: -- information. 25

MS. ENRIGHT: Exactly. 1 THE COURT: So we were --2 MS. ENRIGHT: On the resources issue. 3 THE COURT: Well, what's been gathered at this 4 5 point? MS. ENRIGHT: So, at this point, we are starting 6 chronologically - makes the most sense to us - with the 7 2009 documents. I don't know what kind of detail your 8 Honor wants to hear. But let me just give you a little 9 bit of housekeeping. What we pull, we then will scan and 10 date stamp. The documents that are being reviewed will 11 start with the 2009 application. And then we will move 12 forward to 2014. 1.3 Mr. Wistow has requested documents that pertain to 14 our monitoring efforts related to 2014. So, then we will 15 move on to those, which is still an ongoing --16 THE COURT: So I guess my question is, you are 17 starting with 2009. So what's been accomplished at this 18 point? 19 As far as? MS. ENRIGHT: 2.0 THE COURT: Has anything been scanned in and date 21 22 stamped? MS. ENRIGHT: Yes, yes. 23 THE COURT: Has anything been reviewed for 24 privilege? 25

MS. ENRIGHT: We have been reviewing things for privilege, your Honor. But it's -- without this confidentiality piece resolved, it will be helpful to move forward with that. But yes, we have commenced.

THE COURT: Because, I guess one of the things I'm wondering, the time frame is that the Hospital Conversion Act talks about that a lot of this information — other than things that are confidential and others — are available by the public for inspection.

And you know better than I of the position our Attorney General's office has taken about the ten-days and the 20-day extension. So I guess you are saying that you wouldn't even be able to make those available to the public within the 30 days, if this was a public records request.

MS. ENRIGHT: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: Because I'm having real trouble understanding 30 and 90 days.

MS. ENRIGHT: Your Honor, if I may?

We do have the public records request pending that relates to this matter from the union. And because of the amount of material, we have had to ask for a short extension of time with that response to Friday. But we are -- we are in the process right now of pulling documents that -- you know, these are almost decade old

documents coming out of storage. When it's publicly available documents that, I believe, that is referring to --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. ENRIGHT: -- is the documents that are available on our website that relate to the recent hospital conversions, which would include the application. It would include supplemental exhibits that are not legally protected or confidential or, excuse me, privileged.

THE COURT: Okay. So, there are some documents you are representing that have been scanned in and date stamped at this point. There hasn't been really anything done in terms of privilege because you are waiting on a ruling on the confidentiality.

MS. ENRIGHT: Except, your Honor, like I -- I just offered, we can move forward with production, you know, the self-imposed deadline of two weeks on those three very relevant questions, with responses to those, and provide a privilege log.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. And there hasn't been -other than possibly a confidentiality log that was in the
past, there's been nothing that's been produced by the
Attorney General's office from November 3 until today?

MS. ENRIGHT: To special counsel.

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. ENRIGHT: Correct. 1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 2 MS. ENRIGHT: And now if I can just address the 3 confidential documents? 4 THE COURT: Before we get there, just a question I 5 forgot to ask your brother as well. 6 It appears that there were certain modifications. 7 believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, Attorney Wistow, 8 there was something in your papers that said question two 9 has been eliminated. I believe it said without 10 prejudice. 11 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes, yes. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MS. ENRIGHT: Attorney Wistow did reference that 14 there were no agreements coming out of that meeting, 15 which was not our understanding. But if that is an 16 agreement that is --17 THE COURT: Well, what I am referring to is in the 18 reply --19 The subpoena. MS. ENRIGHT: 20 There's an exhibit that said that number 21 THE COURT: two is not -- and then I believe you referenced in your 22 papers something about one and three. And I just wanted 23 to know - I understand two - is there anything else? 24 Just so I know what's before me, is -- was there any --25

is there any agreement between the parties on question 1 one and three? 2 MS. ENRIGHT: On one and three, I believe we reached 3 agreement. But I'm -- I would suggest that we consult 4 Attorney Wistow. 5 MR. WISTOW: I would like to put everything on the 6 7 record, your Honor. THE COURT: I'm sorry? I would -- if there supposedly an MR. WISTOW: 9 agreement, I would like to have it on the record. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 I think that's what we are doing. MS. ENRIGHT: 12 THE COURT: We will circle back to it. So it's 13 clear in terms of number two. We will address one and 14 15 three later. Okay. 16 MS. ENRIGHT: THE COURT: Let me -- one at a time. 17 MS. ENRIGHT: Okay. On the confidential and legally 18 protected documents, your Honor, I think it's relevant at 19 this point to acknowledge that I have been contacted by 20 both Rick Land, who represents the old coentities, and 21 Joe Cavanagh, who has contacted me as a representative on 22 behalf of the new owner Prospect CharterCare. And they 23 have come -- they are present. I don't know if they want 24 to be heard today. But the message from Rick Land was 25

that the old coentities would not object to a waiver of confidentiality. Since he's here, I'm glad he can correct me if I misunderstood. And my conversation with Joe Cavanagh was just limited to a very brief discussion about that this was on for a hearing today.

But the transacting parties to a Hospital Conversions Act review have the ability to request legal protection for certain documents. These are not our documents. I just want to reiterate that these are the documents belonging to the third parties. And as articulated in our filings, the applicants' ability to request this legally protected status for certain documents facilitates a comprehensive and thorough regulatory review, which is vital to the regulatory function of the Attorney General.

THE COURT: And I understand that.

I guess my question is — so the confidentiality, the statute talks about the AG makes a decision beforehand. It's final at that point. And then you have these documents, which I understand, you know, the public policy behind it is so you can review and make it confidential — does the Attorney General have the ability to re-visit that once a final determination is made?

MS. ENRIGHT: I don't see any provision for that in the statute or any precedent for it. I think that --

(phone ringing) 1 MR. WISTOW: Forgive me, your Honor. 2 One more and you lose the phone. THE COURT: 3 I am going to --MR. WISTOW: 4 Just take the battery out. THE COURT: 5 MR. WISTOW: I'm going to blame my grandson who 6 taught me how to --7 THE COURT: Please, counsel, go ahead. 8 The -- what is clear to me is that the MS. ENRIGHT: 9 statute binds the Attorney General to the confidentiality 10 determination. 11 THE COURT: So, because I was just confused because 12 the November 2 response -- (phone ringing) 13 Why don't you -- Sheriff, why don't you just take 14 it? 15 That's a good --MR. WISTOW: 16 I will just turn it off. THE SHERIFF: 17 MR. WISTOW: Forgive me, your Honor. 18 In your November 2 response, you had THE COURT: 19 This was a subpoena issued to St. Joe's 20 sent a response. and said, "The Attorney General requests notification of 21 any confidential documents produced pursuant to this 22 subpoena. As such production will constitute a waiver of 23 a confidential protections provided by the Attorney 24 General's office." 25

1	MS. ENRIGHT: My concern with
2	THE COURT: I thought you just told me it's fine.
3	MS. ENRIGHT: No. My the it is fine. I just
4	need
5	THE COURT: Final.
6	MS. ENRIGHT: I just need to be notified.
7	THE COURT: But are you saying that all of a sudden
8	the records that you deemed confidential would no longer
9	be confidential if
10	MS. ENRIGHT: If disclosed to a third party?
11	Yes.
12	THE COURT: I'm saying the statute. That's my
13	understanding.
14	MS. ENRIGHT: Oh, okay. So, if if St. Joe's had
15	responded to that subpoena with confidential documents, I
16	think that our confidentiality is compromised by the
17	disclosure to a third party. And I was requesting notice
18	of that disclosure for our record keeping purposes.
19	And
20	THE COURT: So you are not necessarily saying that
21	you wouldn't still take a position that it was
22	confidential?
23	MS. ENRIGHT: I think it jeopardizes the
24	confidentiality to release it to a third party.
25	THE COURT: Okay.

I raise it because in the two sets of papers, it seems to say two opposite things. So we have -- we have confidential documents. And I think you laid it out appropriately to the Court that there's really two avenues if the Court feels the need to disclose them to special counsel. One is a waiver by the parties and the other is through some type of -- some type of court order.

MS. ENRIGHT: And now that both parties are here, maybe there's a possibility of working forward towards some agreement.

But, again, our position is that, you know, we cannot produce them in compliance with the statute until -- unless and until that happens, or we have a court order.

If I can, at this time, Judge, just re-visit the request one and three?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. ENRIGHT: The subpoena references in requests one and three. We had discussed with Mr. Wistow, and I think reached agreement, that we were limiting requests one and three to the 2009 and the 2014 hospital conversions. There was broader language, so that -- that was why we raised that in our wherefore paragraph.

THE COURT: Why don't we address that at this point.

Is there any agreement on that or no? 1 MR. WISTOW: I'm not sure I understand what the 2 Attorney General is suggesting. 3 THE COURT: Maybe just clarify. 4 MS. ENRIGHT: Okay. So, if I may, the first request 5 relates to all documents relating to the plan. And the 6 third request is for all documents relating to any 7 Hospital Conversions Act Proceeding. That is defined 8 earlier in his definition section with limiting languages 9 to 2014 and 2009. "Including all documents relating to 10 applications, amended applications, supplemental 11 applications, exhibits, supporting documentation, or 12 other documents submitted in connection with Hospital 13 Conversion Act Proceedings." 14 Because we have conducted six Hospital Conversion 15 Act Proceedings within the past few years, we just want 16 to confirm that that's limited to 2009, 2014. 17 MR. WISTOW: Yes, that's right. 18 THE COURT: Very good. Okay. 19 MS. ENRIGHT: Your Honor, in closing --20 MR. WISTOW: But the documents relating to the plan. 2.1 If they have any documents that relate to the plan, it's 22 not limited to 2009, 2014. 23 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to -- it seems rather 24 than doing this - and I can take the bench again if I 25

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need to - the parties can speak at the end of this and see if you can come up with language. And we can put it on the record to clarify.

I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MS. ENRIGHT: So, in closing, I -- I just want to review the wherefore clause of my most recent filing requesting that the Court allow production of the documents and privilege logs on a rolling basis. We've addressed requests one and three. That no response is necessary as to request number two, which we have also, I believe, agreed to. Number four, to extend the time for the Attorney General to respond with 90 days from the return date or until February 15th; your Honor, with that being the final production, if rolling production is permitted. Materials subject to the confidentiality determination required by the Hospital Conversion Act statute - in the section we spent some time on - may not be produced by the Attorney General absent consent by the parties or court order.

Finally, your Honor, special counsel we would like to provide us with — happy to assist with — reasonable search terms for electronic discovery.

THE COURT: Let me ask a question on that because I just want to clarify that: reasonable search terms.

Have you disclosed to the special counsel in terms of

what type of electronic information you have? I mean, is 1 it solely e-mail? For example, in a lot of the state 2 agencies when there's a review conducted, there's 3 proprietary software that's being used. So, you are 4 Is there a -- has there asking him for search terms. 5 been any disclosure in terms of what is being searched? 6 There has been no discussion. MS. ENRIGHT: So, no. 7 THE COURT: So how can you ask him to give you 8 search terms? 9 MS. ENRIGHT: I'm happy to suggest search terms that 10 I --11 I don't mean that. But isn't the first THE COURT: 12 issue -- what is the universe we are talking about? 13 mean, are we just talking about the Attorney General's 14 e-mail system? Or are we talking about some other 15 database where a hospital conversion is done? Or are we 16 talking about thumb drives and other things? 17 I think I can stop you right at the MS. ENRIGHT: 18 19 first option. E-mail? THE COURT: 20 I think it's limited to the Attorney 21 MS. ENRIGHT: General's database system, computer system. I don't --22 THE COURT: But that may be more than just the 23 e-mails? 24 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes, they could be more than the 25

e-mails. 1 THE COURT: It could be Microsoft Word documents? 2 It could be Excel spread sheets? 3 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes. 4 Very good. THE COURT: 5 I want to address one thing you raised And, okay. 6 in your first papers and a little bit in the second, the 7 whole issue of expert's reports. 8 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes. 9 THE COURT: Under 23-17-14-13, it talks about 10 reports which should be made publicly available. 11 MS. ENRIGHT: Uh-huh. 12 In your papers, you modify that and use THE COURT: 13 the word "final reports." 14 MS. ENRIGHT: Uh-huh. 15 THE COURT: Please tell me your understanding of 16 17 this. MS. ENRIGHT: 18 So --THE COURT: I just don't want this coming up later 19 20 on. MS. ENRIGHT: So --21. THE COURT: The statute says "reports." 22 And -- the reason why I may have MS. ENRIGHT: Yes. 23 put the qualifying word "final" in front is because it 24 would be our position that any draft reports with our 25

expert, who we have legally protected communications 1 with, would be subject to a privilege potentially. So, 2 the final reports pursuant to the Hospital Conversions 3 Act are reports that are publicly available. 4 THE COURT: So -- so, okay, so I understand it. 5 we may have to address in the future reports because 6 there may be, like you said, there might be something 7 that may be captured under another privilege. There may 8 also be a letter from an outside attorney or an investment banker or actuary or whatever else that's 10 giving you certain information. I guess it just doesn't 11 make -- "final report" is going to have to determine what 12 that means. But that's something I guess you will 13 address in your privilege log. 14 MS. ENRIGHT: Yes, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Very well. 16 Let me just -- I had made some notes in terms of 17 what type of things we have here. Okay. 18 I think that covers everything. 19 MS. ENRIGHT: Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 21 Counsel? 22 I was surprised to Your Honor, please. MR. WISTOW: 23 hear that -- I shouldn't say I'm surprised. If we are 24 going to have some kind of rolling discovery, which 25

appears to be the case, I would much prefer to have the 1 documents related to 2014 before 2009. And if they 2. started on 2009, let's have them stop and start on 2014. 3 And let's get those as quickly -- the other thing I'd ask 4 for, your Honor, is it's one thing to talk about rolling 5 I want to avoid -- and I know your Honor discovery. 6 doesn't want to see us again fighting about this. 7 I would like to have some kind of dates. And that's not just some open-ended "rolling discovery" where two 9 days before the deadline, everything comes in. 10 must be some way of setting some kind of reasonable 11 deadlines. 12 Let me point out, again, this is material that -- I 13 don't understand why I can't get the application 14 tomorrow, literally, and all the materials associated 15 with it. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 The matter before the Court -- counsel? 18 MR. CAVANAGH: Your Honor, if I may be heard 1.9 briefly? 20 THE COURT: I don't think -- if you filed an entry 21 of appearance or -- I will allow to you do it afterwards. 22 Go ahead. 23 MR. CAVANAGH: Thank you, your Honor. 24

On behalf of Prospect CharterCare LLC, who, I think

your Honor's aware, was the resulting entity or the entity that owns and operates the services sometimes referred to as New Co. I -- we've received notice through informal channels of today's proceedings. I wanted to be sure that we came and reserved on the record our rights with respect to the production.

We have materials that were submitted under the HCA to the Attorney General back in connection with the 2014 transaction. And the -- our reading of the material submitted today led us to conclude that potentially, at least special counsel was requesting an order from this Court that would have compelled production of those materials absent our opportunity to review and be heard.

I've not reviewed the materials at this point. Just recently being brought up to speed on these issues. But certainly with that type of relief being requested, I wanted to appear today and reserve our rights, all rights in that regard.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. CAVANAGH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Attorney Callaci?

MR. CALLACI: May I?

THE COURT: Please.

MR CALLACI: Chris Callaci, on behalf of United Nurses & Allied Professionals.

Your Honor, my comments may not be as timely now as they were when I walked into your courtroom an hour ago. I would like them to be on the record. Thank you for the opportunity.

Back in August, Senate President Dominick Ruggerio called for the AG to lead an investigation into the collapse of the subject pension plan. And we were -- we were quick to object. The AG is a regulator -- played a pivotal role, obviously, in the approval of the Prospect CharterCare joint venture. And the potential for a conflict of interest was obvious. And, indeed, we were not the only one objecting to the idea that he would be the one to lead the investigation.

It did not occur to us back in August, however, that the magnitude of -- what the magnitude would be of such a conflict of interest. And now we are here today, and we well know what the magnitude of that conflict is. We are grateful that the AG is not leading this investigation, that Special Counsel Wistow and his team have been charged in that responsibility.

Let me just say a couple of things. The AG's pleadings here are not likely to serve the plan participants very well. In fact, we think that the opposite is true. These kinds of legal maneuvers will more than likely be detrimental to their interests in

THE COURT: Thank you.

being able to retire with dignity and with respect. We are deeply troubled by the AG's actions here, which we believe are contrary to his public calls for transparency.

We are equally troubled by the appearance of noncooperatation coming from the AG. Special Counsel Wistow uses the following terms in his papers to describe what's going on here. He speaks to the AG as "impairing the receiver's investigation, placing undo burden on the receiver, hamstringing the receiver's investigation, slow walking the production of documents." And I ask a rhetorical question here. Is there really a compelling reason why the AG is refusing to produce a document entitled, "Expert report analyzing and evaluating the pension fund"? It is a thundering obviousity that that would be something that should be forthcoming without delay.

This has to be truly heartbreaking for our plan participants to hear this kind of thing about their AG. So, moving slowly here, your Honor, is obviously not a motion -- an option, I'm sorry, for plan participants and their families who are facing an imminent cut - it appears to us - in benefits in February. So we stand in support of the motion to compel.

MR. CALLACI: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Any of the other attorneys who have entered wish to be heard?

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I know CharterCare has a -- or St. Joe's, sorry, has a position.

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MR. LAND: Judge, Richard Land on behalf of St. Joseph's, the petitioner. Your Honor, I will be very

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brief. I was mentioned by Ms. Enright. My client has no objection to the disclosure of the information. I did

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send Mr. Wistow a communication yesterday. We would only

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like to reserve relative to attorney-client privilege

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materials, which I frankly don't think are included, but

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Mr. Wistow indicated a willingness to enter into a

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protective order with Prospect. Perhaps that can cover

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that issue for us as well. As a general rule, we are not

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THE COURT: Thank you.

objecting.

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Okay. This Court has considered the papers that

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have been filed and the arguments of counsel here today.

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The subpoena in this case was issued to the Office of Rhode Island Attorney General pursuant to orders of this

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Court dated September 13, 2017, and October 27, 2017,

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which permitted the special master and special counsel to

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issue subpoenas. On October 17, prior to the second

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order, this Court issued an order approving and

appointing special counsel. The special counsel's engagement includes gathering information and determining whether or not there exists claims against third parties by the pension plan estate.

A subpoena for documents was properly served on the Office of the Rhode Island Attorney General on November 3, 2017. The subpoena was returnable on November 17th at 11 a.m. at the offices of the special counsel. On November 6, a proof of service was filed with this Court. On November 16th, the Office of the Attorney General filed a partial objection to the subpoena. On November 17th, the special counsel filed a motion to overrule the partial objection by the Attorney General and compel a response. On November 27, the Office of the Attorney General filed an objection to the motion to compel. And on November 28, the special counsel filed a reply. His motion has been heard this afternoon.

First of all, this Court will note that there have been agreements among the parties to modify the scope of the subpoena, including number two, which has been -- has been taken off the list without prejudice. Numbers one and three are subject to some modifications, as the Court asked during oral arguments. The Court will allow counsel to converse after this is completed. And if

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necessary, we certainly can put that agreement on the record.

There are several issues that were addressed in the motion and in the objection and reply. First, dealing with the production of publicly available documents. As the Attorney General has conceded in their most recent papers and here today, that objection is withdrawn. The Attorney General will provide all publicly available documents that are within the scope of the subpoena to the special counsel.

The second issue deals with the Attorney General's objection that the special counsel should be required to provide search terms to serve electronic records. The Attorney General has indicated during oral argument that it has not yet identified which systems electronically stored information is contained that is responsive to the subpoena. So, the Court finds that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to put the onus on the special counsel to provide search terms.

Certainly this Court is not adverse in any respect to once identification is complete — again, is it just an e-mail system, an analysis system, thumb drive storage or other electronic media — of working through search terms that may be appropriate.

Fortunately on November 6, 2017, the Rhode Island

Supreme Court adopted revisions to the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure. These new rules deal with
electronically stored information, and they are extremely
helpful here. In that, the Supreme Court modified not
only Rule 26 but other rules to provide for how
electronic discovery shall be dealt with. And that's
exactly what we have.

So, in accordance with the new rules, the Court orders that counsel for the Attorney General, as well as the special counsel, meet and confer in person. The Attorney General's office shall bring with them someone with knowledge of the information technology systems used by the Attorney General. And the special counsel may have available an information technology person as well.

The Court finds, and it's been this Court's experience in the past, that many times it's helpful that if the two subject matter experts speak, they can work out a way that the special counsel can get the information he wants. And the Attorney General, in this case, can run certain searches and save a lot of time and expense for everyone.

Specifically, the plan and the court order require that comes out of this meeting is one, a discussion of the types of electronic information maintained by the Office of Attorney General; a discussion of the

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preservation of any electronic information; the format by which the special counsel wishes the information to be produced; the search terms or other methods by which the electronic media will be assessed and searched; the method for serving or preserving claims of privilege or protection of information after production; and general terms that would include a fallback agreement; the method for asserting or preserving confidentiality of proprietary information, if applicable; the date or dates for compliance with the electronic information.

This Court will require that if a plan is not submitted to this Court on or before December 7, 2017, at 4:30, if the plan is not agreed to, the parties will still submit to the Court the portions of the plan that are agreed to. And each party shall delineate what their final proposal was to each. At that point the Court will review it and make a determination and issue an order with respect to the plan.

With respect to confidential documents, this Court may allow for disclosure of these documents at a minimum under the terms of a protective order. This Court finds that the most effective way — based on the arguments today and hearing from both Prospect and CharterCare — I'm sorry — and St. Joe's — is that these documents will be issued to the special counsel under the terms of a

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protective order. This is the most effective way and efficient way to give the special master and special counsel access to all of these documents.

The Court will also then take up at the request of the special counsel whether or not these records should at some point become part of the public record. But rather than going through a process there that may require briefing and other issues, the Court will issue a protective order to allow for the immediate disclosure to the special master and special counsel of those documents that are deemed confidential by the Attorney General's office.

The Court would also like to address the issue of a privilege log. What the Court has done or tried to do since the beginning of this matter — once again, we have people here that are plan participants — is to try and help everyone understand the terms of the process going forward. Now we are talking, finally, in terms of the time for production. But even when things are required to be produced, the Office of the Attorney General in this case will be required to produce documents to the special counsel.

The law allows but does not require that the Attorney General may raise what we call in the law "privileges." If the Attorney General asserts a

privilege with respect to a document, he will not be required at that time to produce that document, even if they are responsive to what the special counsel has asked for.

However, the Attorney General, if they assert a privilege — and I'm saying if, because they haven't reviewed all the documents at this point — will be required to prepare something called a privilege log. And in this log, as to each document that they're saying there's a privilege, the Attorney General must provide sufficient information for the special counsel to evaluate whether or not that privilege should apply.

If there is a dispute between the special counsel and the Attorney General about whether or not a document should have been produced, the Court, upon request of the special counsel, will convene a hearing and in certain cases may view certain documents through what's called an in camera inspection, which is to look at them in order to help the Court make a decision as to whether or not a privilege applied.

So, the Attorney General in their papers raised three of these privileges. So let me tell you what they are because when the documents come back in, there will be a privilege. And it may delineate one, two, three or all of these privileges. And the first one really

applies to government agencies. It started with applying to the President of the United States. This was developed way back during the Nixon administration in something called executive privilege.

And the courts have found another privilege called deliberative process privilege. And this privilege is a qualified privilege. It may be raised by the Attorney General. What it protects is the internal deliberations of an agency to safeguard the process for agency decisions. The reason behind it is that we don't want to foil the free exchange of ideas within the regulator — in this case, the Attorney General's office — during the course of their decision-making, in this case, about whether to approve or not approve an application.

However, there are certain rules you can't just say everything is deliberative. There's two words in the law. One says that it has to be predecisional and the second is it has to be deliberative.

Predecisional means it was prepared to assist an agency decision-maker at arriving at his or her decision. Deliberative means making recommendations or expressing opinions on legal or policy matters, as opposed to factual or objective material outside the deliberative process which cannot be withheld.

Now, even if deliberative process is asserted by the

Attorney General, this Court may be able to review documents and weigh certain competing interests to determine whether or not it should apply. But just realize -- and again, this is the Attorney General's call, but there may be certain documents after applications were filed that internally went into the decision-making process on policy or other things that may come to us as part of a privilege log. It doesn't mean they are not going to be turned over at this point. But it means the special counsel will review them.

There's also something called the work product privilege that they've raised. And that's documents that have been prepared or obtained in the anticipation or because of the prospect of litigation, lawsuits. Again, it may be raised or not raised. It's the Attorney General's decision to make. And this is divided into two categories: documents that contain mental impressions of an attorney or their legal theory, and those are pretty much the highest type of exempted disclosure.

There's also something called factual work product. And as I said, while this opinion work product or the attorney notes have absolute immunity, factual work product is qualified. This Court can hold a hearing and make a decision based on the set of legal factors of whether or not — even though there's that work product

privilege - certain information is going to be disclosed to the special counsel.

Lastly, the Attorney General raises the prospect of what's called the attorney-client privilege. The client, in this case the Attorney General, can invoke that privilege. And that's communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking professional advice, as well as the responses by the attorney that are privileged and not subject to disclosure.

Fortunately, many of these issues were dealt with by my colleague Justice Silverstein in two very -- cases that received a lot of attention years ago, the lead paint case and more recently in the 38 Studios litigation. And some of these have, including in the lead paint case, many of these issues in terms of privilege have been reviewed. And the opinions are from our Rhode Island Supreme Court which is binding upon this Court.

So I just want to be clear that what we are going to talk about, finally, is when these things need to be produced. But I want everyone to understand that the production will come in. And there may also be what are called privilege logs, which are documents that a choice has been made to assert a privilege and then Attorney Wistow or the special counsel will go through a process

and have discussion about these.

it may take some more time.

this case the special counsel.

It's -- this is important because what I want everyone to understand is the date that the Court sets for the return of this subpoena — which again is passed at this point. The Attorney General has properly filed an objection — may very well not be the end of the issue in terms of what documents are produced from the Attorney

General's office because we may get a privilege log, and

Now, subpoenas in this case under court order are issued under the Superior Court rules. And those rules do not indicate the amount of time that shall be afforded the person subject to the subpoena to respond. The date may be put down by the party issuing the subpoena, in

The Court, however, upon the filing of an objection, which the Attorney General's office did at this point, may determine whether or not there has been a reasonable time for compliance. In this case, the Court must balance the request for more time by the Attorney General's office with the need and timeliness of this information by the special counsel.

This Court has publicly stated in other proceedings in this case that there are insufficient funds in the pension plan to pay all members the benefits they are

entitled to under the pension plan. In fact, based on the reports of the special master, without a large infusion of assets into the plan, the benefits to some or all or part of the plan members may need to be significantly reduced in February of 2018. I have been very upfront about that.

Whether or not there are claims against third parties can only be determined after the special counsel completes or substantially completes their investigation. While the special counsel has issued a number of subpoenas, it is likely that the information obtained from one subpoena may lead to further request and information from other sources.

So, for every delay in getting pieces of information, it only delays the special counsel's decision, which is his charge to determine whether or not any assets may be brought into the pension plan.

The Court also recognizes that we have a lot of documents here and that the Attorney General must be given the opportunity to gather, review, and produce responsive documents. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the Attorney General's office has been 26 days thus far. The Court had pressed the Attorney General's office during oral argument of what steps they have taken during the past 26 days, including how many

individuals have been assigned, whether the responsive documents have been identified, the status of privilege logs, and the amount of documents that have been produced.

While the Attorney General's office has taken some steps, the Court is terribly concerned where we are after 26 days. As I mentioned before, a large group of these documents are deemed public records. And our Attorney General's office has been loud and clear with cities and towns and other parties — some of those cases before me — that the city and town has 30 days to respond on a publicly available — even if they have many documents.

What we have here is the Attorney General — I understand the circumstance is slightly different — asking for 90 additional days or actually more than that, if we look at when the subpoena was served on November 3.

After weighing these factors, the Court will order a rolling production of documents by the Attorney General. I have ordered, as part of the electronic records, that the parties meet and confer and put together a plan. The order will also require a plan that's agreed to between the special counsel and the Attorney General's office in terms of his priorities in terms of production.

The Court, understanding the amount of documents we are talking about here, will extend the Attorney

General's compliance day on the subpoena until January the 15th. However, the Court wants not only a plan but the Court wants a weekly update to both the special counsel and a copy to this Court beginning December 5, 2017, and weekly thereafter. This way the Court and either the request of the special counsel or on its own initiative can bring the parties back in, because we are not going to be extending that day.

On that day, all of the documents that are not privileged will be produced. A full privilege log will be produced. And the Attorney General's office should be in a position that if any of the documents are marked privilege, that they have ready access to them if the Court requires an in camera review or further proceedings in this matter.

The Court is going to ask the special counsel to prepare a draft of the appropriate order, circulate it to the Attorney General's office. If the order is -- if the order is agreed to, the Court will sign it. If there is a dispute, the Court will review any competing orders by the end of this week and enter the order.

We need to continue this process, and at the same time, the Court completely understands and appreciates the decision that the Attorney General needs to make in terms of what, if any, privileges may be released, will

1	be taken with respect to the production.
2	Thank you very much, counsel.
3	Court is in recess.
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